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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

RELIGION CITED AS MAJOR SUPPORT FOR U. S. MILITARISM

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, 1986 pp 46-47

[Article by A. Zakharov and S. Kuzina: "With Cross and Bomb -- Religion in the Service of Imperialism"]

[Text] The achievement of military superiority, restoration of the leadership role of the U. S. in the world and destruction of socialism as a social system -- these are the objectives of the ruling circles in Washington. The Reagan Administration attempts to justify its strategy of "direct confrontation" between the U. S. and USSR in the eyes of ordinary Americans and world public opinion through the most varied forms of propaganda, including religious propaganda.

It must be noted that increased religious activism became an important feature in the social makeup of the U. S. in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, many of the most important United States political documents are buttressed by references to religious views, and the influence of religious organizations on politics has multiplied in recent years. It is no accident that in the presidential elections of 1980 and 1984 all the candidates for the White House fervently emphasized their religiosity. Thus, in declaring his candidacy for a second term, Reagan asserted, in particular, that he was prompted to do this most of all by a desire to "return God to the schools" (i.e., introduce religious indoctrination in secondary educational institutions).

The drawing together of religion and politics is a phenomenon presently observed throughout the capitalist world. However, it is namely in the U. S. that ultraconservative circles use religion to attempt to justify direct preparations for war. For example, according to a report by the American newspaper INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, several popular conservative preachers stated that "an atomic attack will herald the arrival of Christ and the day of judgement." A. R. Allen, founder of one of the Pentecostal trends, in his book "My Vision of the Destruction of America," painted a picture of how "it was revealed to him that the U. S. would perish as a result of war against the USSR from atomic bombs and nerve gas."

The American mass media overflows with such "revelations," and they undoubtedly create a certain psychological frame of mind. But it would still be a partial victory if we were speaking merely about dozens of preachers.

Much more dangerous is the fact that not only individual religious figures, but also politicians at the highest level use the Bible to give blessing to nuclear war. With the aid of religion, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE emphasizes, "Americans, it seems, are taught to love the nuclear bomb."

Just the same, why in recent years has religion begun to so actively enter the political arena in the West? First of all, it is because under the conditions of the grave crisis which Christianity is experiencing, it frequently agrees to assist any political program proposed by those in power, for the sake of strengthening its prestige and maintaining its social status. Moreover, often many religious figures claim the role of arbiters, who possess the only true solution to contentious political issues. At the same time, in recent years many Western political figures have been more and more inclined to refer to religious doctrines to buttress their actions in the field of international relations.

The following law has been observed: The crueler and more inhumane imperialist policy becomes, the more willingly it is declared a cause pleasing to God. This hypocrisy knows no bounds. Whereas previously the atomic bomb was called simply "the atomic bomb," or a "weapon of murder," now it has turned into a "sword of God's wrath." A new intercontinental ballistic missile receives the name "Peacekeeper," and a nuclear submarine is called Corpus Christi ["Telo Khristovo" -- Body of Christ].

Numerous right wing religious political organizations -- the so-called "new religious right" or "Christian right" -- which arose in the U. S. on the crest of the "conservative wave" of the late 1970s, played a prominent role in propagandizing justification for the arms race. The Moral Majority, Christian Voice and Religious Roundtable became the best known of these. They are extremely influential (true, in certain social strata). For example, the Moral Majority numbers approximately four million adherents.

Reagan listened to the voice of the religious conservatives even before his election as President, and at the present time, authoritative investigators assert, "at the level of stated principles there are no differences between Reagan and the right wing orthodox Protestants," despite individual disagreements on practical questions. Back in 1980 clergyman Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority, took part in preparing the Republican Party platform, and in the election campaign representatives of the "Christian right" met with Republican Party representative B. Brody on three occasions. Right wing Christian organizations have direct ties to the Pentagon. Thus, Falwell, citing Gen L. Walt, former U. S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant, repeatedly stated that "the United States was confronted with military superiority of the Soviet Union" due to the "soft" attitude of the previous administration toward the USSR.

Another example of such cooperation is found in the co-authorship of a number of books on strategic military issues by retired Admiral C. Ward, former president of the American Security Council, and new right movement activist Phyllis Schlafley. In the words of the American journal NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, "the central thesis of these books amounts to the assertion that certain influential U. S. governmental figures are taking part in a plot, the

aim of which is U. S. unilateral disarmament." From here, the journal notes, "if we trace the logic of the authors, in the end we come to the simple conclusion that the U. S. simply cannot be secure in the nuclear age, if it is not capable of making a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union with impunity."

The Christian right demands that an end be put to the "terrible decline," in which, in their words, the United States finds itself. In accordance with the traditional scheme of the American propaganda machine, they seek the root of the evil in foreign intrigues. According to them, the communists are primarily responsible for America's difficulties, and along with them the "flabby liberals," who did nothing during the 1970s to prevent the "threat hanging over the U. S." They see a "severe" [zhestokiy] policy with respect to the USSR as the only way out. "The Russians understand only strength," asserts clergyman Falwell. With respect to this, all U. S. Government documents aimed at whipping up the arms race are invariably approved. Leaders of the Christian right ascribe the most improbable designs to our country. "The forces of evil," writes this same Falwell, "are trying to destroy America precisely because she is the main bastion of Christianity."

In view of these obscurantists, the world looks like this: America is a country chosen by God for a special mission -- to save "Christian values," and the "evil empire" headed by the USSR is encroaching on these values. Opposition to "godless communism" in all fields is stated to be the main goal of the U. S. Government. The fundamental socio-economic differences between the two systems, capitalism and socialism, are replaced by opposition between the "Christian nations" (the U. S. and its NATO allies) and the "godless communists" (the countries of the socialist community).

This scheme corresponds fully to the aspiration of the White House, since the representatives of the military-industrial complex in power are trying, and not without success, to drum into the minds of broad strata of Americans the thought of the inevitability and the necessity of a policy of preparations for war.

As a result of complex historic development, many religious values were organically woven into the very fabric of social life in the United States. The "average" American is sure that Christianity will never bring anything bad. After all, that which is instilled in weekly sermons, books, treatises and social life itself, that which is "instilled with mother's milk," turns into stereotypical thinking. As a result, people who are alien to any form of militancy become silent participants in preparations for catastrophe.

What is presented to Americans as the "will of God?" On the whole, it is the very same program which the ultra-right wing of the current Washington administration defends and tries to implement. It proclaims the impossibility of any kind of detente, since resistance to communism is the moral and religious duty of the U. S. Government. "A political leader, as a servant of God," asserts Falwell, "is an avenger, called upon to rain down God's anger on those who do evil."

Calls to "punish the communists" are usually buttressed by open falsification of the facts according to Pentagon recipes. Thus, defending the steady growth of military expenditures, the leader of the Moral Majority declares that "today the Soviet Union can destroy from 135 million to 160 million Americans, while the United States can destroy only 3-5 percent of the Russians." The matter is in no way limited to purely propagandistic speeches. The "Christian right" involves itself energetically in the political struggle, financing the electoral campaigns of candidates who suit them and "ruining" their enemies. Many observers believe that senators Frank Church and George McGovern, advocates of detente, suffered defeat in Senate elections exclusively due to agitation by "right-wing Christians," who accused them of "deviating from their Christian duty to defend the country."

It is not without interest that the Christian conservative movement attempts to maintain warm relations with mighty Zionist capital, and that the slogan "Support Israel at Any Price" was advanced as one of their key points of their program, and that they even call themselves "Zionists," although, as American religious researcher (F. Kolombo) indicates, "support of Israel obviously openly contradicted the main principle of the movement, namely the desire to restore the purity of Christianity."

Here, however, the political essence of Christian conservatism manifested itself most clearly, since the "Zionism" which it declared was nothing other than an expression of hostility to such a "cosmopolitan, sinful and morally incompetent institutions" as the UN. We note that the views of the "Christian right" on this issue correspond fully to the campaign unleashed by the U. S. authorities against the organizations of the international community. As for practical actions, Jerry Falwell repeatedly rendered purely political services to M. Begin, head of the Israeli Government. Thus, in 1981, when Israeli aviation subjected Beirut to barbarous bombings, Falwell personally phoned Begin to "encourage" him, and then actively propagandized for the Israeli aggression in the U. S.

One wonders just the same why the religious preachers of war enjoy the widespread support of ordinary Americans. Some 25 million people hear and see Falwell's Sunday television sermons, and there are many preachers such as he in America. Voluntary contributions by television viewers to the Moral Majority organization alone constitute \$46 million per year.

The new edition of the CPSU Program states: "The general crisis of capitalism is deepening... the internal instability of the economy is intensifying, which is reflected in a decline in overall growth rates and in the interlacing and deepening of cyclical and structural crises. Mass unemployment and inflation have become chronic illnesses and budgetary deficits and state debts are reaching colossal scales."

These processes cannot help but be reflected in the consciousness of the classes and social groups which constitute present American society. They engender confusion, fear of the future and contradictory understanding of their positions among the petty bourgeoisie. And it is no accident that right wing Christian organizations consist mainly of the petty bourgeoisie. Many prominent scholars emphasize that religious conservatives are "a huge mass of

Americans, relatively uncultured and poor." "Members of the new right," writes American researcher (G. Kater) direct their appeals to those who feel alienated from those who possess political, economic and cultural power (the "elites"), but who, at the same time, separate themselves from those who make use of the charity of governmental services (the unemployed, homeless)."

The ideas of the "Christian right" also have substantial influence on those groups of workers who are such only by their position, and not by origin, having lost their small amount of capital and been forced to sell their labor, but who retain a petty bourgeois psychology.

Something in particular should be said about the military-religious service in the U. S. Armed Forces. It numbers more than 3,000 chaplains of the main faiths, for which the American budget allocates \$75-80 million annually to maintain. Such a substantial sum indicates the great importance which U. S. ruling circles attribute to religious preparation of military personnel. One of the American propaganda manuals writes that "measures carried out by chaplains are one of the best levers for raising the morale of the personnel."

Military clergymen are the most reactionary part of the clergy in the United States, as well as the other NATO countries. Therefore, changes in the international climate during the period of detente did not affect their activity. Chaplains instill in their wards that detente was "advantageous only to the communists," that it weakens the political will of the defenders of "Western civilization," etc. They constantly emphasize the extremely close link between Christianity and "American patriotism." For example, for many decades the fact that the percentage of Catholics in the U. S. Army is much higher than their share of the U. S. population as a whole has remained a subject of pride on the part of Catholic chaplains.

Army and Navy clergymen understand fully the militaristic policy of the Reagan Administration and actively propagandize all Pentagon initiatives such as the "star wars" program and the deployment of MX missiles. They attempt to sanctify in the name of God all of the evil deeds to which U. S. ruling circles push the soldiers and officers, and they persistently sow the thought that anti-communism is an integral part of the faith.

Various religious measures, of which each chaplain conducts an average of up to 3,000 per year, are called upon to facilitate the spiritual enslavement of military servicemen. These include daily prayer, religious days, confessions, etc. The exalted nature of these measures and the architecture and trappings of the military churches themselves (extensive use of militaristic symbols) are called upon to intensify the social and psychological effect on the feelings of the believers. Often, religious sermons are conducted near the barracks and under field conditions. Besides permanent and field churches there exist chaplains corners and "prayer rooms." In them the serviceman can listen to religious radio and television programs and go to confession. We note, apropos of this, that more than 400 radio and television stations are in operation in the Armed Forces. A quarterly edition of the Chaplains' Council, MILITARY CHAPLAIN'S REVIEW, is published.

Besides their main functions, military clergymen give lectures on the international situation, organize leisure activities, as well as reveal "subversive elements" among the soldiers and officers, for which special card indexes are kept. The activity of chaplains is not limited only to armed forces personnel, but also affects the family members of military personnel, as well as local residents, for whom, for example, joint religious holidays are organized.

It is noted in the foreign press that the influence of the U. S. military religious service extends to the population and armed forces of the NATO countries. Since the early 1980s a unified religious military program has been adopted, aimed at developing a unified feeling of "Atlantic solidarity" in the struggle against the common foe -- communism.

As they force the tempo of the arms race and exacerbate the international situation to dangerous levels, right wing politicians desire to free themselves of responsibility by shifting it to God. At the same time, religious conservatives placate the believers by references to the same will of God. What happens as a result is that, while the American believer reads the Bible, seeking in it confirmation of the preaching of the "right wing Christians," new warheads come off the conveyers in U. S. military factories and unprecedented sums are allocated to the Pentagon. This is when the alliance between religion and politics becomes especially sinister.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

COMMUNICATIONS DURING MEETING ENGAGEMENT

Moscow VOYENNNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 11, Nov 86 pp 81-83

[Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Yefremov, communications chief in a motorized rifle battalion: "Communications In The Meeting Engagement"]

[Text] I read Senior Lieutenant S. Chuksin's letter "The Communications Chief's Role and Place in Battle" (Voyennyy Vestnik, No 7, 1986) and the problems that the author touched upon are close and understandable to me.

I have been a battalion communications chief for several years and for two of those years was part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the DRA. I have acquired certain experience in working in this position and I will relate to you how the problems of planning and organizing communications in the meeting engagement were resolved in our battalion.

During a tactical exercise battalion commander Major G. Kostyuk received a real combat mission -- move to the area of the Babur Gorge and rout a band of Dushman.

In making his decision, Major Kostyuk planned for one company to fix the enemy along the front and for the battalion's main force to advance toward the gorge and attack simultaneously from different directions to destroy the subelements of the Dushman band.

The battalion commander worked over the map to set up the battle. He soon issued instructions to prepare subunits for actual operations. Based on his instructions and the combat order I understood that we had to operate on separate avenues and at rather great depths. These conditions meant that a lot depended on the accuracy of my communications operators' work.

The senior headquarter's communications instructions were received by radio. I will mention that I listened to this transmission along with the battalion chief of staff. I immediately noted the deployment locations, the preparation time and the avenue for displacing the command post on the operations map. I wrote the sequence for setting up communications and other issues in my work book. And I also obtained the necessary radio operating data. The battalion communication platoon was reinforced with one KShM [command and staff vehicle] and crew and two portable radios. The battery volume fit our needs.

The chief of staff then gave me instructions on how to support communications and also determined the time for reporting documentation.

Joining the platoon, I acquainted my subordinates with our mission and ordered them to ready the equipment. Only then did I start evaluating the communications situation, developing a decision and preparing the necessary documentation.

One should think that it would be advisable to spend more time on evaluating the communications situation, for this is one of the most important moments in a communications chief's work. From my own experience and through contacts with communications officers I know that at times this problem is resolved in a hurry. I am now convinced that the more thorough and active the intelligence collection, processing and analysis process is, the more stable and reliable command and control is. There is then less need to deviate from your own direct responsibilities during the battle. I therefore recommend that the journal's readers examine the following method for evaluating the communication situation.

"The Dushman are able to jam the short wave and UHF bands in the up-coming battle and it is therefore necessary to plan for radio-security and anti-jamming measures.

Command and control of subunits in the mountains will be provided primarily through radio communications. Consequently the screening effects of the mountains and radio wave interference at the reception point will affect its stability. We must conduct radio training with the battalion officers in order to increase communications reliability. In addition to a practical development of the problems in maintaining uninterrupted command and control, this training should also include advice on the effective placement of radios and the most effective use of antennas.

During the move, communications will be provided by mobile (when possible) and signal equipment. During the helicopter movement, communications with the senior commander will be maintained through the aviators. Communications with the equipment that is moving with us will be through the air support controllers located in the battalion column and in the assault.

Special attention will be focused on providing communications with the company that is operating to the rear of the bandits and with the reconnaissance element.

It is advisable to provide communications "upwards" using two radio nets (one using the attached KShM equipment]. No less than two radios will be allocated to the reserve.

We must meet with interested officials to exchange radio operating data, refine the sequence for radio communications and also examine the problems of using notification and command-and-control signals and discuss the methods for transmitting them. The first order of business is correcting the radio communications schematic that had been developed earlier.

The communications platoon has been augmented with personnel and equipment. Approximately 70 percent of my subordinates have experience in combat operations. One must keep in mind that it is possible to lose both personnel and equipment. Therefore one must foresee the possibility of conducting communications operations with limited equipment and also of having nonorganic radio operators isolated from the platoons. I must ask the battalion chief of staff to allow them to attend the radio training.

The terrain in the area is very broken and we have to operate in various avenues. Consequently the radio operators have to carry not two, but three spare sets of charged batteries. Batteries that are not fully charged are to be given to the senior communications chief for charging.

Conclusion: the communications platoon is able to carry out its combat mission. There are four hours to plan and set up communications. Recommendations and documentation must be to the motorized rifle battalion chief of staff by 1700 hours and communications must be ready by 1800 hours."

Certainly the sequence for evaluating the communications situation may differ, depending on the specific situation. And the communications chief's professional training has a very important role in this. An experienced officer is already starting to evaluate the situation while the senior headquarter's combat mission and communications instructions are being clarified.

Then, on the basis of the motorized rifle battalion commander's decision, the chief of staff's instructions and the calculations that I made and my conclusions, I made my decision on setting up communications and reported it to the chief of staff at the indicated time. He approved my documentation. I feel that this is the place to note the following. I had just recently developed a radio communication schematic on the map and I had consequently wasted some time. But experience has shown that it is advisable to have a schematic that has been developed ahead of time on a single piece of paper. It is then possible to simply refine it or make corrections while developing a decision and it is not necessary to start anew. On this occasion I was able to resolve the problem of setting up radio communications literally in minutes and the time that I saved was used to accomplish other things.

After my report, I issued orders to the squad leaders and radio-telephone operators. In my opinion, when assigning tasks, one must reach the point where every subordinate understands what is required from him in the up-coming battle. One must then check how the soldiers have assimilated their assigned task and how they will operate in the various situations and stages of battle.

At the indicated time I conducted the radio training, assisted the appropriate officials in clarifying the operating sequence in the radio net and the visual and sound signals used in command and control. I then reported that communications were ready for the move and for battle.

We soon set out to accomplish our combat mission. I was constantly with the battalion commander, knew the situation, the state of communications and was

able to influence its operations. Major Kostyuk commanded the subunits primarily by radio with brief commands and signals.

The column halted at the assigned location. Battalion personnel headed by Major Kostyuk mounted the helicopters and the equipment continued its march toward Babur Gorge (the deputy battalion commander for technical matters was in charge). Major Kostyuk maintained communications with the column on the aviation group commander's radio net through the air support controllers.

Battalion subunits landed successfully and immediately sent out reconnaissance patrols. The company that had landed in the Dushman's rear was soon attacked on two sides, from the front and the rear. At the request of the company commander, Captain A. Tereshchenko, who was awarded the Order of the Red Star, air support controllers sent out combat helicopters and passed them the exact coordinates of the targets. The helicopters were thus able to make a powerful strike on these targets. Radio-telephone operator Senior Sergeant S. Akimento used the R-159 to report the situation to the battalion command and observation post and he attentively followed the situation on the battlefield. He was the first to catch sight of the bandits who had tried to organize an attack against the subunits from a third side and he reported this to the company commander in a timely manner. He then killed several Dushman with well-aimed shots from this automatic rifle, threw several others back with grenades and forced them to drop flat. Captain Tereshchenko sent an order to the reserve via radio and the reserve was able to scatter the attacking enemy.

The Dushman obviously did not want to accept the fact that there were Soviet subunits operating in their rear area. They therefore decided that if they could not destroy the company, they would force it to move from its position that was blocking their movement into the gorge and was threatening the band's main force. Reconnaissance patrols reported to the company commander that new Dushman subelements were approaching and were preparing to attack.

Captain Tereshchenko decided to set up an all-around defense and fix the enemy after establishing a multi-tiered firing system. He reported this to the battalion commander.

At that time the battalion GPZ [advance party] began to battle the band's main force. Major Kostyuk ordered the third company to maneuver and use the results of combat helicopter strikes to rout the bandits by attacking from the heights and working together with the subunits that were attacking from the front.

I focused a lot of attention on maintaining uninterrupted communications with those subunits that had the decisive role at a given moment. As Hero of the Soviet Union Major R. Aushev correctly noted in his article "There Is No Reliable Command And Control Without Communications" (Voyennyy Vestnik, No 8, 1986), the communications chief seems to have all the threads to support command and control in his hands. Therefore it is impossible to allow communications with any element in the combat formation to drop in the difficult meeting engagement. One has to resolve those missions that suddenly arise during the course of the battle.

The order was given to select an area to receive helicopters with ammunition, food and water. Because this was a crucial task and none of the officers with the battalion commander were nearby, I had to lead this group of soldiers.

Although I was gone a short time, the subunit commanders and communications personnel were able to cope with the problems of command and control. True, there were brief breaks in the radio operators' work.

For example, the cable connecting the receiver-transmitter to the power supply in Senior Radio-Telephone Operator Private A. Kiriyeiko's radio was cut by bullets. He did not get flustered and quickly repaired the damage. By the way, he was awarded the medal "For Combat Feats."

Chief of the KShM crew Junior Sergeant V. Korzhov acted skillfully and bravely and was awarded the medal "For Military Service." He was maintaining communications between the battalion commander and the senior chief. A group of Dushman had moved along the flank of the motorized rifle battalion command and observation post. The vigilant communicator caught sight of this group in time and reported them to Major Kostyuk. He then opened fire with a machine gun. And there were other cases where communications personnel took the initiative and acted skillfully.

It is very evident that it is easier to react to changes in the situation and to bind the enemy to one's will if communications works reliably in the difficult conditions of a meeting engagement and the battalion commander is able to command and control his subunits easily.

Thus it is to the credit of the communications operators that the meeting engagement was won. Their excellent professional skills, good moral and psychological qualities and physical training facilitated the maintenance of reliable communications.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

COL GEN GRINKEVICH ON TIME FACTOR IN COMBAT

Moscow VOYENNIY VESTNIK in Russian No 11, Nov 86 pp 2-5

[Article by Colonel General D. Grinkevich, Ground Forces Chief of the General Staff: "The Time Factor in Battle"]

[Text] Time has always played a critical role in battle and the ability of one side to operate faster than its enemy has often had a decisive effect on the course and outcome of engagements, battles and even military campaigns. The great Suvorov found the key to his own brilliant victories precisely in his ability to be more nimble than his enemy and he considered the calibrated eye, speed and the charge to be his main tactical principals. He said, "The moment provides the victory. One moment decides the outcome of a battle and one hour -- the success of a campaign. I do not operate in hours, but rather in minutes."

After absorbing the achievements of the past's military thought and combat experience, Soviet military art was developed on the basis of Leninist instructions that "procrastination is like death" in armed conflict. From the very beginning a characteristic trait of our military art was our military leaders' and commanders' aspiration to keep the enemy from concentrating his forces on the primary avenues and to make sudden, staggering strikes against the enemy at the necessary time and place. This was especially evident during the Great Patriotic War.

The importance of the time factor in battle is constantly increasing and has a directly correlation to the combat capabilities of forces. It is taking on a special role under contemporary conditions. The revolution in military affairs has qualitatively altered battle's material base. And whereas in past wars the belligerents had weapons at their disposal with which they could attack each other and inflict only partial losses, the modern means of destruction, with their enormous destructive forces, allow entire subunits, units and elements of a force's combat formation to be almost instantly put out of action.

The increased fire power, shock force, mobility, and land and air maneuverability that forces have is compressing the duration of combat

operations and causing frequent and radical changes in the situation, variety in the methods for resolving tactical missions and an increase in its rate of accomplishment. Battle is somehow being condensed in time. Those goals which were previously gained through long, persistent battles can now be attained in hours and even minutes.

Thus time has taken on a material quality and has been transformed into one of the decisive factors of combat force. One can say without exaggeration that to forestall the enemy in contemporary battle is to beat him and to delay is to suffer defeat.

The desire to win time must permeate combat operations at all levels and in all spheres, from the receipt of the combat mission to the final triumphal round. It must permeate all rungs of the military organism, from the commander to the soldier. Any hitch, any delay in organizing the battle or during battle, may result in the failure to accomplish the assigned mission. Armed combat is a two-sided phenomenon and the enemy will not wait. He is also trying to grasp the initiative and bind it to his will.

All of this puts special responsibility on the commanders, those people who organize the battle. When other conditions are equal, the commander who is able to quickly orient himself to the situation, is able to have his forces maneuver energetically and who knows his opponent, his weak and strong points, better, who is faster at getting his decision to his subordinates and supporting its accomplishment, will enjoy greater success.

One of the decisive conditions for success in battle is the ability of the commander and his staff to support the timeliness of decision-making in battle and to get those decisions to their forces. In setting out to do this, the commander must carefully evaluate the factor of time and must make the appropriate estimation. The difficulty in this is that everything must be accomplished in an extremely compressed time frame.

For example, during the Great Patriotic War a battalion prepared for two to four days for an offensive battle at the regimental level. Sometimes up to one day and even more of this time was spent on making the decision, but now the commander and his staff will have only hours to accomplish this. And although the volume of the tasks that they must resolve has increased significantly, a commander must confine himself to the minimum time to give subunits and units more time to directly prepare for battle, establish mutual support and provide comprehensive support to combat operations.

Now that one comes to think about it, is there a lot of benefit in a decision that has been developed in detail, but whose acceptance has been delayed? And this is exactly what happened to battalion commander Major A. Zamyatin at a recent tactical exercise. During the battle he and his staff were deep in the defensive position for almost three hours working on their own command and control problems and thus they gave the company commanders almost no time to refine the mission for their subordinates.

In a real battle the situation could have changed drastically in that amount of time. This would have eliminated any meaning from the decision and it

would therefore have lost all of its value. The experience of the last war convincingly supports this. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy recalled, "Unfortunately what happened is that the higher levels in the chain of command issued their orders and instructions without considering the time and condition of the units that had to execute those orders. In the dynamics of battle these orders couldn't catch up with the events and when they reached the troops, they did not correspond to the new situation. As a result the order at times reflected only a burning desire and were not supported by the real capabilities of the troops.

Exercises show that the changing nature of battle demands corresponding changes in the methods for command and control. When there is a critical shortage of time, there is even more justification for combining such process as clarifying the mission and evaluating the situation, adopting and developing the decision, issuing orders to subordinates and establishing mutual support, all of which are closely related. Individual elements in the decision may be further developed even while missions are being clarified as to their importance and urgency. The commander makes the primary decisions. Other elements may be decided at the same time by his deputies or staff officers. This method of organizing work allows the time for planning combat operations to be reduced significantly and provides more time for subordinate commanders and staffs to prepare their forces.

Modern battle drastically increases the combined arms commander's role in commanding and controlling his forces. He must totally know the nature of his forces, the enemy's strong and weak points, the equipment and weapons of organic and attached units and subunits of the arms of service, the methods for using them and the sequence for establishing mutual support with them, to include with army aviation and especially helicopters gunships. Otherwise it is impossible to avoid wasting time.

And there are increased demands made on the staff. It must collect, summarize and analyze intelligence material in an effective manner, develop conclusions, make tactical calculations and prepared well-founded recommendations to help the commander make his decision. Every staff officer must always know the situation, be able to report it briefly and clearly and also be able to send missions to subunits in a timely manner and monitor their execution.

The chiefs of the arms of service and services must make an effort not to limit themselves to reporting on the condition of their subordinate units and subunits and must display as much creativity and initiative as possible to most effectively use the capabilities of their forces and assets in battle. Their timely and expedient recommendations must significantly ease and accelerate the combined arms commander's adoption of a well-founded decision.

The time for gathering and analyzing the situation, the most time-consuming part of the commander's and staff's work, is now being compressed to the limit. Meanwhile the volume of the information coming in to a regiment and battalion has increased many-fold as compared to the past war. And now there are modern technical means, automated systems and computers to assist in this process.

Unfortunately there are many officers at the regimental and battalion level who are still timidly using this equipment to resolve combat training missions and who gravitate to the old "manual" work methods. Because of this too much time is being spent on making decisions. The time it takes to assign missions to subordinates is stretching out, fire missions are not being made in a timely manner and the assigned times for attacks are not being met. And there are times when, for a lot of different reasons, combined arms commanders do not have time to assign specific missions to attached and supporting subunits during exercises. One would pay dearly for such omissions in a real battle.

The is to make extensive use of the entire arsenal of technical means that is available in the forces, as well as the other capabilities, in order to gain time and provide a reliable quality to the work in organizing the battle and commanding and controlling subunits. It is necessary to school people in the use of technical means, starting school benches and constantly improving their skills in this area through command training in units and in tactical and command and staff exercises.

In attempting to reduce the time for making his decision, the commander must in every case maintain the quality of his decision and ensure that it conforms to the situation at hand, for the more powerful the means for waging war, the more expensive the errors in their employment. The lack of sufficient intelligence or contradictory intelligence stresses, and not frees the commander from his obligation to make a timely decision. But only commanders who have developed tactical-operational foresight can cope with this task.

Foresight is not simply the ability to guess the course of events. It supposes an intense knowledge of the nature of contemporary battle, a comprehensive accounting of the factors that have an affect on its development and on the basis for forecasting the enemy's assumed operations, and also the ability to find the proper course and take countermeasures in a timely manner. Foresight demands that the commander be creative and prepared to take a justified risk.

We must create difficult, dynamic, non-standard situations in command-and-staff and combined arms tactical exercises in order to develop the ability to forecast in battle. We must also introduce crises situations that correspond to the nature of modern battle. Commanders and staffs that are training must be given only the same amount of intelligence on the enemy that they could acquire with the forces and means at their disposal. This will train them to actively reconnoiter, quickly analyze the situation and avoid stereotyping their operations. It is these original and daring decisions that permit surprise attacks on the enemy, catch him unaware and thus attain the best results in battle.

One method for saving time is to inform subordinates beforehand about upcoming missions and to get the commander's immediate assistants actively involved in command and control operations. Combat warning orders are becoming widespread. These not only contain instructions on preparing troops for combat operations, on the nature of such operations and their direction, but also examples of the combat missions which, and this must never be forgotten, must be carried out directly on the battlefield.

The first level in the sphere of command-and-control activities is to transmit combat orders to the troops in the dynamics of battle. The ability of the commander and staff to react to changes in the situation is manifested primarily in their refining missions and the sequence of mutual support among troops and assets and getting this information to those who carry out the orders in a timely manner. Other reserves for saving time include contact with subordinate commanders and personally assigning them missions by radio, and these must not be disregarded.

We must increase our attention on this point since some units and subunits are not focusing enough attention on developing and improving the appropriate skills in the command training process. The problems of commanding and controlling subunits and fire support are not considered at times and as a result there is a discrepancy between theory and practice. And when this reaches the process of organizing the terrain for battle, reconnoitering and developing a system of fire and maneuvering, some officers are in difficult straits, become flustered and allow miscalculations and errors.

There are times when the reason for failures is the discrepancy between the methods for assigning missions and the time that is available. It is time that we understand that verbose orders, those that can be replaced with short signals, and extended reports are increasingly contradictory to the rapid development of events on the battlefield and it is time that we train people to avoid these errors. We must really teach commanders and staff officers to value time in battle.

But, whereas some loss of time in command and control operations may put forces in an unfavorable or difficult situation, it is possible to make up for it to a certain degree. However, when this time loss occurs in operations involving weapons, the result may be defeat. If the enemy has guided or homing weapons, reconnaissance-and-strike and firing complexes and other highly accurate means of destruction, it is necessary to do everything possible to reduce the time for carrying out fire mission. At the present, time calculations are not made in hours, but in minutes or even seconds. The side that can count on victory is the side that first detects a target and attacks, is first able to make an aimed shot or volley, that is faster at completing his maneuver and overcoming obstacles and that uses the results of weapons strikes without delay. And this requires an exceptionally high level of personnel training. Personnel must be able to destroy a target with their first shot and have team (crew) interchangeability, the ability to eliminate very simple deficiencies in a very short time and many other qualities that are developed in the military training process.

Thanks to the tireless concern on the part of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, Soviet Ground Forces as well as the other Services are equipped with increasingly improved weapons and military equipment, equipment that concedes nothing to similar types of foreign models, but instead more often exceeds them. The mission at hand is for every soldier to have the level of knowledge and skills that will allow him to better forestall the operations of the most disciplined enemy and to more effectively use the combat capabilities of his own forces and equipment and his own weapon.

The primary thing for representatives of all arms of service to do when conducting military training with their equipment and fire and movement patterns is to develop normatives for the various types of training. These define the level of military skill that is necessary in modern battle. But training to carry out these norms will be extremely useful only when they are combined with tactical missions. People can get to know the real value of time and can acquire the ability to make time their reliable ally only when they collide with a reality that is close to actual battle.

We must also not forget that gaining time in battle depends to a great deal on the discipline of personnel, the moral and fighting qualities of the soldiers, their psychological tempering and their ability to staunchly endure the difficulties of march and field conditions and to operate bravely and selflessly. These qualities do not come by themselves. They are developed in the process of military and psychological training and are defined by the entire tenor of the life in subunits and units.

The role of party and political work is drastically increasing in the successful resolution of problems associated with the time factor. It has to strengthen the moral spirit of soldiers, teach them solid military qualities and constantly support an offensive passion and military discipline. Commanders must set the example in this. They must display courage and calm, decisiveness and initiative in the difficult conditions of modern battle.

The guarantee for these actions is a firm conviction in the correctness of our cause, devotion to the Motherland and the affairs of communism, a high feeling of responsibility, a thorough knowledge of regulations and manuals and an understanding of the nature of contemporary battle.

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NAVAL FORCES

BALTIC FLEET COMMANDER ON COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Aug 86 p 2

[Interview with Vice Adm V. Ivanov, Baltic Fleet Commander, by Capt 2nd Rank A. Pilipchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA permanent correspondent with the Baltic Fleet, under the rubric "The Combat Training: Reserves for Acceleration": "Beyond the Boundary of What Has Been Achieved"]

[Text] Personnel of the twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet are fittingly continuing the traditions of the older generations of Baltic Fleet sailors. The fleet is actively engaged in a struggle to further improve the combat and political training, to strengthen military discipline and fulfill the commitments in the competition. The climate is a working one, so to speak, and reserves are being sought among the Baltic Fleet sailors. Today, this has to mean that the problems involved in the restructuring and acceleration are being persistently resolved in the fleet. Vice Admiral V. Ivanov, Baltic Fleet Commander, tells about the situation in the main area of the fleet's concerns in an interview with Captain 2nd Rank A. Pilipchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA permanent correspondent with the Baltic Fleet.

[Question] Comrade Vice Admiral, what concerns you most of all in the situation today, in view of the fact that stable results have been achieved in the combat and political training in many units and on many ships?

[Answer] Stability in any area of our work is not something which is achieved once and for all, particularly on the path of acceleration. Behind stability in this area there must be constant good results in the accomplishment of the new and more complex tasks. That is to say: this stability has nothing in common with a state of complacency. On the contrary, it requires unceasing quest and constant effort. We can see and are acutely aware of what must be done, and we understand that it must be done vigorously. This means that there must be an active inner attunement, a desire to make the most efficient use of time, possibilities and resources.

[Question] Could one say then that the strivings of the Baltic Fleet sailors today are directed beyond the framework of what has been achieved, of the accustomed?

[Answer] In general, the strivings of the Baltic Fleet sailors, like those of all Soviet sailors, which are defined by the interests of combat readiness, have always been characterized by a creative and innovative approach to the job--whether it has been the mastery of new equipment, the enhancement of combat skills or the expansion of the cruising range. Take a look at the map. The Baltic Sea is essentially a relatively small, closed body of water, and each day the fleet operations officer begins his report on the activities of our ships from the Southern Hemisphere, the middle of the Atlantic or the Mediterranean. We left the accustomed geographic boundaries of the Baltic long ago. Today, as we truly concern ourselves with making the fleet more powerful, we must go beyond the boundaries of the former pace in all areas of the work, and particularly in the combat training.

[Question] Not an easy task, and one which obviously requires the activation of all reserves?

[Answer] The main reserves are our own capabilities, and the main difficulties involve realizing them. When we soberly assess the state of affairs in the fleet, we understand that far from everyone has been drawn into the restructuring process. When I talk with the commanders and officers, I become convinced that the psychological restructuring of the people is frequently retarded by certain intermediate elements. Let us say that a young seagoing officer is fervently convinced that one should be honest and objective in all things, frankly express one's opinion on problems and not try to make things appear better than they are but strive to actually improve the results of one's work. And then certain more experienced comrades, "old hands," so to speak, sometimes try to "straighten out" the zealous youth, to teach them "flexibility" and "wisdom." The latter sometimes conceal obsolete timeserving, a striving for personal security and tranquility in the service, and a superficial regard for the job. This mentality is the main hindrance to the restructuring. We therefore see our most important task as one of achieving a situation from top to bottom, at all levels, in which people place the interests of the job above all else.

[Question] It appears that both the creative focus of the common effort at all fleet levels and the initiative and innovation of the individual people are important?

[Answer] Absolutely. Everything which promotes the cause must be revealed, supported and accepted without any sort of procrastination, bureaucratic vacillation or departmental disagreement.

I would cite two examples. An idea for ensuring navigational secrecy most effectively in the combat training emerged on the submarine Bryanskiy Komsomolets. Captain 3rd Rank A. Vasilev came up with it. To the honor of the formation commander and specialists at fleet headquarters, the officer's suggestion was received with complete seriousness. It will be verified theoretically and undergo practical testing.

The second example involves the training subunit headed by Captain 2nd Rank P. Blinkovskiy. It has built simulators and set up training equipment for training the battle crews. An operating model of a ship's main control station with the equipment for controlling the weapons and machinery has essentially been created. Ships' crews can practice several different operations with it.

It is significant that initiatives like these are ceasing to be isolated ones. This is being encouraged in great part by the trend of granting greater independence to commanders at various levels, primarily the formation commanders, a trend which is gaining strength in the fleet.

[Question] The independence is unquestionably helping to fully reveal the efficiency, the party and professional qualities of the officers in charge. Apparently, however, it is at the same time revealing the inadequacy of certain people holding positions of responsibility?

[Answer] Yes, there is sometimes a sort of reassessment of values. That which was not revealed by the certification procedures, which were sometimes carried out in a neutral and tranquil setting, are now being tested by the restructuring. Captain 2nd Rank I. Mokhov was advanced to his latest position as a promising officer, for example. He was always described as such, but his superiors were apparently not being objective. At any rate, the independence granted to him and the demands made of him with respect to making his leadership and the training and indoctrination of subordinates more effective have defied him.

Captain 1st Rank V. Biryukov has responded entirely differently to the increased independence granted to him in his work. Before he joined the military team, its situation was average: there were no flops, as they say, nor were there any particular advances. Biryukov succeeded in rapidly moving the collective off dead center. He is capable of bold planning: he himself is inspired by an idea, gets others interested in the idea and works persistently and consistently to see the matter through to the end.

The officer immediately ascertained the weakest link in the chain of preparation, training and indoctrination of the personnel. That link was the petty officers. All of us know the junior commander's role in the military collective. We have talked a great deal for a long time about the fact that the petty officers have generally given up their active positions in the fleet, and we are attempting to do something.... There has been almost no decisive progress, however.

Biryukov took his specific and precisely defined proposals to Vice Admiral V. Kolmagorov, fleet Chief of Staff, obtained approval and set about the work. He and the staff and political organ officers were not afraid to experiment, and they got their way. There was a marked improvement in the collective in the quality of the individual preparation of the first-term sailors and in the classes and drills in their specialty. I believe that the experience in enhancing the role of the petty officers in the subunits should now be extended to the entire fleet.

[Question] We know that the restructuring is a complex process, that there are no beaten paths. Among the leaders who are putting their hearts into the restructuring, there are therefore also uncertain ones who have not understood the profoundly new demands. What is the attitude toward them in the fleet?

[Answer] Time does not wait. Allowances are made for none of us in this matter, but we still take an understanding attitude toward those who, while rejecting the imperfection of the old, are still seeking ways to achieve a qualitative advance in the results of the combat training and in other areas of our work. Rapid success is always gratifying, of course, but thoroughgoing reforms oriented toward

the future frequently demand endurance, particular persistence and patience. There are still ships and formation which are performing below the expected level. This does not make the fleet's command happy, of course, but before drawing any conclusions, we carefully study the situation at the sites. If there are favorable trends, we provide assistance and are patient. If the situation requires decisive intervention, we take immediate steps, even to the point of re-assigning personnel.

[Question] The accomplishment of the combat training tasks is of crucial importance, of course. What are the fleet's guidelines in this matter?

[Answer] There is just one guideline: the combat training is our most important and crucial matter, which means that the main time and attention are given over to it. No other tasks must be accomplished at its expense. And it is necessary to give up many habits, even traditions, which are unjustified and impractical from the standpoint of combat training interests. We have to make it approach combat reality, practice the combat training missions on a comprehensive basis and rid ourselves of both the prominent deficiencies--those existing in the handling of the training itself, for example--and those which are petty but which greatly harm the cause, such as the removal of personnel for details, unjustified all-out, last-minute efforts and excessive ceremonies. For example, we have done away with the ritual, if I may, of splendid receptions for senior chiefs on the ships and formations, a ceremony which came into existence who knows how long ago. During these receptions, large numbers of people are sometimes taken away from their routine jobs in order to provide imposing representation, to create a background. What for? All of the chiefs, including the commander, visit a unit or a ship in order to work. Those around them should be doing the same.

There are no other criteria today, nor can there be any other criteria, for assessing those around us and for self-evaluation, other than the actual contribution to the common cause. The restructuring demands that we constantly strive to exceed what we have achieved--that is, intense and inspired work for the good of the society.

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NAVAL FORCES

CHERNAVIN ON NEED FOR COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 86 pp 26-33

[Article by Flt Adm V. Chernavin, commander in chief, Naval Forces, USSR deputy minister of defense, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Combat Readiness of Naval Forces -- at the Level of Modern Requirements"]

[Text] The mission of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in our day is great and responsible -- to safeguard reliably the creative labor of the Soviet people as they implement the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, and to ensure the security of the homeland with all their might.

Lenin's Communist Party is consistently conducting a peace loving policy and making every effort to preserve peace on earth. This is convincingly indicated by the extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 Jan 87. But, as time is showing, the U. S. and its NATO allies remain deaf to the peace initiatives of the USSR, continue to whip up tension, force the pace of the arms race and build up the already huge arsenals of nuclear weapons. In this environment it is vitally important to be on guard, to be ready constantly to stop the intrigues of imperialism against our country and her allies, to repulse a surprise attack by the aggressor and to inflict upon him a decisive defeat, regardless of what means of armed conflict he employs. As M. S. Gorbachev stated in his replies to questions by the chief editor of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO, we will never sacrifice the interests of security and will make no concessions at its expense.

Soviet naval personnel accomplish their missions within the unified ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces. They defend reliably the sea borders of the fatherland, improve persistently their military skill and maintain the combat readiness of large units, ships and units at a level which meets the demands of the day.

Combat readiness is the condition which determines the level of preparedness of troops and naval forces to fulfill the combat missions assigned to them. It includes necessary supplies of materiel and maintenance of weapons and equipment in an operable and ready state, and is determined primarily by the level of naval training of the personnel and their moral-political tempering; the professionalism of command cadres and staffs; and firm military discipline and self-discipline at all levels and in all collectives.

One of the basic criteria of combat readiness is the level of tactical training of command cadres. Modern naval warfare, with the use of new types of weapons, will be decisive and dynamic in nature, have abrupt changes in the situation and be distinguished by a sharp struggle for initiative and to gain time. Even a small error by the commander or the slightest delay in weapons employment may predetermine the unfavorable outcome of combat. Therefore, during the course of commanders' training, officers perfect tactical techniques for naval forces operations, weapons employment and the use of technical equipment in combat and questions pertaining to the organization of tactical coordination, and they develop a unified understanding of the questions which they study.

In the Navy there are many officers who are promising, but who do not have sufficient experience or knowledge. To teach them and arm them with experience is a most important task. The large unit in which Capt First Rank I. Khmel'nov serves approaches the organization of commanders' training in a businesslike and creative way. Here the topics for commanders' training are thoroughly thought out. Active forms of training -- group exercises, short tactical exercises, drills -- are used effectively. Command level officers have worked out and mastered the techniques and methods of force operations as they apply to the weapons existing on their ships. Ways of improving training are persistently being sought. The command group, staff and political department serve as the driving generator in this. They not only control, but most of all provide specific assistance on the spot in the organization of the training process. The large unit received a high evaluation at a recent wrap-up inspection.

At the same time, experience shows that the main stage in improving the tactical maturity of ship, unit and large unit commanders is accomplishing missions at sea during tactical exercises, especially two-sided exercises, which involve equal groupings of opposing forces. Only in such exercises, saturated with specific military content, and under conditions of physical and moral tension, can commanders and staffs be sure in practice of the advisability or groundlessness of their decisions and obtain practice in the organization of coordination and command and control in combat. And for this we strictly adhere to the fundamental principle: Train the personnel under extreme conditions, involving the continuous opposition of a strong, well trained enemy. A difficult situation encourages the commander to make non-standard, bold decisions, based on thorough analysis of the capabilities of his forces and an objective assessment of the opposing side.

However, many do not realize to the maximum the capabilities contained in the military training system. Serious complaints can be made about some communist leaders in the large unit in which officers N. Moskal'ev and V. Yelovskiy are serving. At a recent command and staff exercise the slipshod actions by these commanders, in combination with a low level of individual training, led to the non-fulfillment of the assigned military training mission. And not only Moskal'ev and Yelovskiy, who had been in their positions a little more than a year, were at fault for what took place. A substantial share of the blame should be placed on R. Dymov, an experienced officer who was unable to organize high quality training of subordinate commanders. The work of

training ship commanders and military crews in the large units where officers N. Galko and P. Svyatashov serve was also inadequately effective. There active forms of training are rarely applied, there are an insufficient number of demonstrations, not all planned training measures are fulfilled with a high level of quality and the methodological level of certain leaders is still low.

What are the reasons for these shortcomings which exist in the training of command level officers? During inspections in the fleets I have heard references to the heavy burden on the commander from matters not relating to military training. And this is in fact so. Along with the growing complexity of the missions accomplished by the large unit or ship, the circle of duties assigned to commanders has sharply increased. They have been required to change their style of work and develop the ability to find rapidly effective ways of solving the main and fundamental questions of commanders' activity defined in the Navy Regulations.

Unfortunately, some command cadres have been unable to restructure their style, and these officers frequently accomplish general tasks, even housekeeping, at the expense of time allocated for commanders' training. Apparently the time has come for a serious, scientifically based reexamination of the tasks assigned to the commander, so that he has the opportunity to accomplish the main task -- improve the combat readiness of the large unit, ship or unit. There is also still more to be desired in the way of organization of the independent training of officers. Some senior officers have begun to forget that independent training is one of the main forms of tactical training of the officer.

Just the same, the main reason for shortcomings in commanders' training revolves around inertia in the thinking of some leaders, adherence to an outmoded style of leadership of military training and attempts to solve urgent problems and new tasks by old methods. For example, making training adhere more closely to combat reality is an acute and burning question in the Navy. However, the commanders of some large units and ships are doing little to solve this task and await instructions from above. Frequently there are cases of oversimplification in exercises. One sees the formal fulfillment of the requirements of guidance documents for the organization of a training battle, but the battle itself often is a previously played "spectacle," which naturally hampers the development of initiative, independent thinking and qualities of organization and will in commanders. An exercise which took place in the Northern Fleet under the leadership of officers V. Mochalov and O. Faleyev had precisely these shortcomings. It did not achieve the assigned goals and ended with an unnecessary waste of the ship's training time and motor resources.

Today the task is to raise decisively demands made upon military training leaders and set a course toward increasing the efforts aimed at restructuring the thinking and psychology of cadres and their style and methods of work, taking into account the demands of time. The essence of the restructuring of thinking amounts primarily to the recognition by each of his personal responsibility for the punctual, initiative-filled fulfillment of his duties, maintaining an attitude toward training plans and programs as toward an immutable law, shifting attention from quantitative indices of the training

and indoctrination process to qualitative indices, and from intermediate results to end results.

The Navy Military Soviet is persistently carrying out a policy to restructure the style of work and overcome inertia in the thinking of cadres. Questions concerning the creative and initiative-filled approach of a number of commanders and chiefs toward solving combat readiness tasks, strengthening discipline and order and increasing the activeness of the human factor have been examined in its recent sessions. The activity of the leader was evaluated not by words, but by actual deeds, by how he is in practice implementing the instructions of the 27th Party Congress and by how persistently he is involved in organizational and indoctrination work in his assigned area of responsibility. Of course, it is still early to speak about the start of a fundamental turning point. But, a certain movement forward can be seen. Training results have begun to be evaluated much more strictly. There have been fewer assertions and words and more actions. New tactical techniques are being introduced more boldly. The struggle against indulgences and oversimplifications in military training is widening. In particular, this style is characteristic of communist officers A. Dolotov and B. Fomin. In the large unit in which these leaders serve, the activity of officers on the staff and in the political department is aimed at organizing the work right on the ships. The work is comprehensive in nature and is concentrated on teaching commanders and political workers the practice of preparing for and accomplishing military training missions, especially on long cruises. This method has gained the support and approval of all the officers and is having definite, positive results.

The technical modernization of the Navy characteristic of our day increased the requirements for specialized training of officers, warrant officers, petty officers and sailors involved in the operation of complex modern equipment. The combat readiness of naval forces depends greatly on the level of their knowledge and skills. It is clearly understood in the large unit and on the ships that its main components are weapons and equipment which are in good repair and ready to operate and the skill of the specialists. The personnel training system created in the Navy makes it possible, on the whole, to accomplish assigned missions successfully and provide ships and units with specialists of all types. However, the quality of training of some of these specialists can and must be higher. And ways to accomplish this do exist, if we overcome a certain inertia in our thinking. Let us take, for example, simulator equipment. This makes it possible to model and work out the actions of specialists in such extreme situations which are difficult or even impossible to create with the use of other means of training. Simulators provide a good opportunity to develop and maintain in the personnel skills needed in maintenance and in the battle for ship's survivability, and to improve skill constantly and conserve motor resources.

But, unfortunately we do not yet have enough modern simulators. This leads to a situation in which some commanders and chiefs, in the expectation of planned deliveries of training equipment, are continuing to train their subordinates in the old way. We are striving today to organize the production of simulator equipment which meets the requirements of the day. But, there is also another way to improve its quality and make it more modern and effective. Many

commanders, displaying initiative, are improving the simulators which they have and even creating new ones. Among these commanders are officers S. Shmakov, B. Kozhin, Ye. Solotariv, A. Shaurov and others. Thus, unique simulator equipment, created by rationalizers quickly and at less cost than manufactured models, is being used successfully for training operators in the unit in which officer E. Zenkevich is serving. This made it possible to solve the problem of training many specialists.

The absence of personnel from military training has become one of the major retarding factors in the path of improving training quality. In some large units and units and on some ships up to 30 percent of the sailors are at times diverted from lessons to carry out various kinds of housekeeping work. This absence can be significantly reduced if we get away from the settled views on the number of watch duty personnel required when the ship is docked at base. It is time to make more extensive use of the equipment which every large unit and unit has also to establish order on the territory assigned to them. Unfortunately, many commanders and supervisors set greater store on manual labor than on the use of mechanisms. Apparently, some leaders lack the boldness to take on the responsibility and do that which would be better for personnel training and for the combat readiness of large units, units and ships.

The demands of the 27th CPSU Congress that the activity of leaders and collectives be evaluated according to their deeds and the results achieved encourage commanders, staff officers, political organs and party organizations to rethink their work critically and to seek out reserves constantly for the further improvement of the combat readiness of naval forces. Such reserves are found primarily through restructuring the style and methods of work of each official and from increasing the responsibility of supervisors for improving the training and indoctrination process and achieving high end results in their work. Reliance should be placed on developing in commanders of all ranks and staff officers firm skills in organization of military actions, comprehensive employment of all types of weapons in naval combat and command and control in the most complex environment.

Life demands that officers be granted more independence in accomplishing combat and support missions and that stereotyped behavior and standard decisions and actions, which are one of the forms of manifestation of irresponsibility, fear of making mistakes and a desire to hide behind formal instructions and regulations, be rooted out. It is important to pay attention to improving the methodological skill of leaders and their ability competently and instructively to conduct lessons, exercises and drills, and during their conduct to create a complex and dynamic situation. To achieve the maximum effectiveness of training measures, the best supervisors bring out a minimum necessary number of questions at each lesson or exercise and carefully develop them until they are fully understood by the students. Those commanders and supervisors act correctly who, when they are preparing their subordinates for operations under conditions of modern naval combat, take into account the appearance of new types of weapons on the part of the probable enemy, especially means of reconnaissance and of high precision and long range destruction.

Military discipline is an important component of combat readiness. Without it, one might say, combat readiness does not exist. And it begins, indisputably, with the commander. Life has proven that if a demanding commander, who is punctual in fulfilling regulations, tactful and fair, is in charge of a military collective, violations of military discipline among his subordinates are extremely rare. Take, for example, the missile cruiser Slava. Firm military discipline was the foundation on which the cruiser's sailors fulfilled the tasks of long voyages with high indices. Individual work and the creation in the collective of an environment of high principles and intolerance of shortcomings made it possible to ensure the exemplary observance by officers, warrant officers and communists of the requirements of military discipline, and the fulfillment of their military duty. The ship's command group was able to turn its attention toward real life matters and become closer to its people. And the crew is now a harmonious and cohesive collective.

Closeness to people is a regulatory requirement of the commander, which includes respect for the personal work of his subordinates and constant concern about their ideological and professional growth, living conditions, rest and health, in combination with fair demandingness and strictness in accordance with regulations. A leader can gain mutual understanding and earn trust only in living, daily communication with people. Only true closeness to his subordinates enables him to know the real situation on the ship or in the unit or subunit and to effectively influence the strengthening of military discipline and the elimination of delinquencies. Isolation from the personnel on the part of some commanders and supervisors, and permissiveness with regard to "minor" violations of discipline and order and the lack of firm control over the fulfillment of orders leads, as a rule, to gross violations of military discipline. The crew of the ship commanded by Capt Third Rank S. Yegorov came to such a result. On this ship costly equipment was put out of action as a result of Yegorov's lack of control over the activity of his subordinates and poor organization of service and order.

A number of leaders of ships, units, subunits and party organizations still attempt to strengthen discipline by general appeals and obsolete methods and measures. This is useless labor. Without decisively breaking free from settled stereotypes in consciousness and practical activity, and without rejecting obsolete views and habits, the question of improving military discipline and reducing accidents associated with it cannot be resolved. Life demands improvement in the style of leadership at all levels and a shift from issuing directives to organizing specific work on the ground, the goal of which is not only to instruct, but also to go deeply into all spheres of activity of subordinates, from establishing general order in the garrison or on the ship, to organizing the training process and maintaining high combat readiness.

As the 27th Party Congress noted, it is not enough to see shortcomings and flaws and to stigmatize them. It is necessary to do everything to prevent them. For this a decisive turn toward practical deeds is required in the work of strengthening military discipline. Unfortunately, thus far it is going slowly. The inertia of the directive-bureaucratic style of work of the command element is still great. To accelerate restructuring and overcome

inertia is a most important task of commanders, staffs, political organs and party organizations.

And what tremendous opportunities socialist competition gives for improving the level of training, strengthening military discipline and raising self-discipline and order. Organized thoughtfully and creatively, it makes it possible to conduct military training more effectively, use reserves which exist for improving professional skill more fully, and save training time, motor resources and fuel. The experience of ships and units which are in the vanguard of competition indicates this. First of all, this is found in the experience of the crew of the Northern Fleet Nuclear Missile Submarine commanded by Capt First Rank V. Ivanov, the initiator of socialist competition in the Navy. Here, through the joint efforts of the command group and the party and komsomol organizations, a creative attitude on the part of the sailors toward their jobs and a general striving on their part toward high levels of military skill have been created. Considering the personal example set by communists to be a main component in successes in military and political training, the party organization maintains at the center of its attention indoctrinating them in the spirit of high responsibility for appropriate combat readiness, and strengthening its influence on the submariners under conditions close to those of combat. This approach increased the authority of the party organization and caused all crew members to take after the communists. At present there are 33 masters of military affairs on the ship and an absolute majority of them are communists. Capt 3d Rank S. Prisyazhnyy, party organization secretary, is also a master of military affairs. Eighty percent of the subunits headed by communists became "excellent." In a short period of time all the young communists on the submarine gained authorization to fulfill their duties independently.

However, opportunities for competition are not being used fully everywhere. And formalism has become the chief barrier in this path. Socialist commitments often duplicate regular duties and do not take into account reserves and unused capabilities. The ranks of the "excellent" sometimes grow only on paper; here and there results are tallied formalistically. In collectives in which these shortcomings exist the organization of competition requires restructuring and the elimination of formalism. A spirit of competitiveness, creativity and visible rivalry must be established. How can this be done? Apparently the time has come for Navy communists involved in restructuring work to examine attentively and rework certain organizational and grading regulations about competition. In so doing it is necessary to be more bold in doing away with obsolete canons, while at the same time striving not to reject indiscriminately everything which has been accumulated in the military training process.

Fleet political organs and party organizations have the responsible and important tasks of arming communists with a clear understanding of the meaning and goals of restructuring and of encouraging them to take specific, energetic actions to improve the combat readiness of naval forces. Comrade M. S. Gorbachev defined restructuring very completely in his speech at a conference in Khabarovsk: "...each person must begin restructuring, all the work of restructuring, with himself, with determining his civic position, increasing his political and labor activity, strengthening his responsibility for matters

entrusted to him and for end results...plain good sense tells us that everyone must look not somewhere above or below or to the side, to the left or the right. It is necessary... first of all to assign to oneself the task of doing everything according to one's conscience, with a great sense of responsibility to himself and to the people."

The communists on the Pacific Fleet submarine where Capt Lt G. Novikov is party organization secretary understand their role in precisely this way. Here reports made by communists about work accomplished and about increasing personal examples, responsibility and initiative have become a firmly established practice. A feeling of dissatisfaction with what has been achieved and a desire to find reserves and new approaches in fulfilling tasks at sea is persistently inculcated in communists at party meetings and party buro sessions. Communists have an active influence on improving the quality of military training and strengthening order and organization. The ship ranks "excellent;" for more than seven years there have been no gross violations of military discipline.

Numerous such examples can be given. However, the process of restructuring has not gone so far in all Navy party organizations. Here and there they are waiting for something and condone instances when some communists violate order or moral norms. Often some party organizations are attracted by large scale measures, calculated for their "scope," to the detriment of active communication with the personnel. Thus, the process of restructuring has not yet affected the party buro where Capt Third Rank V. Gumel is party secretary. Here no businesslike reaction to shortcomings, nor analysis of problems which exist on the ships is apparent; there is no serious criticism and self-criticism at party meetings and required demands are not made upon communists. Naturally, the end result of such activity by the party organization is not high.

Some commanders and political workers, including senior officials, seem not to have understood the essence of working in the new way. For them, as before, an abundance of words goes along with an absence of specific decisive actions. These leaders are more involved in issuing instructions and resolutions and their inspections in local areas are ineffective. Precisely this style of work is characteristic of officers V. Dmitriyev, Yu. Rummyantsev and A. Kovtunenkov. The situation in areas entrusted to them is slow to be corrected and the quality of military training is low. Meanwhile, these large units and units have learned to criticize others loudly and to seek reasons for failures elsewhere. In studying the situation in the fleets we are also confronted with another extreme. Some leaders are actively involved in self-flagellation and in acknowledging their guilt for all omissions and shortcomings, but behind this is simply a desire to throw sand in the eyes of senior commanders. As a rule, deeds do not follow such "self-criticism." This was the case, in particular, on the large anti-submarine warfare ships Azov, Strogii and certain others.

The time for indulgences and allowances for circumstances is ending. The highest end results in military and political training must be the measure of all authority. This concerns both staff and political organs. Only pity can be expressed that some of them still see themselves in the role of exhorters,

but in no way in the role of organizers. Places where there are no fresh views, the ability to see shortcomings, boldness, a desire to take a justified risk for the sake of improving the military skill of subordinates also have substantially lower results in training and in strengthening discipline.

In speaking about improving the style of activity of staffs and political organs, I would like to emphasize one more thought. Complacency and contentment have already appeared in some leaders after they achieved, let us be frank, insignificant successes. In our life and in the life of military sailors this is extremely dangerous and fraught with serious consequences. There is still much for staffs and political organs to do to ensure that the process of restructuring is increasing stably and truly permanently and to really achieve high end results in military labor and military discipline. An exacting assessment of what has been achieved and a principled approach to determining the real state of affairs in any area are at the center of attention of party reporting and electoral meetings which take place on ships and in units and large units.

The personnel of Navy ships and units understand well that as long as a military threat from imperialism exists, implementation of the program of actions developed by the 27th CPSU Congress to accelerate the social and economic development of the country requires a powerful defensive shield. During the military training process and on distant voyages military sailors strive to serve the socialist fatherland in an exemplary fashion and to raise their level of military training.

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9069

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NAVAL FORCES

PHYSICAL TRAINING AT NAVAL SCHOOLS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Pavliy, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Docent, senior instructor in the Physical Training and Sports Department of the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S.O. Makarov: "On the Sea One Must Be Strong: On Certain Pressing Problems in the Physical Training of Cadets at Naval Schools"]

[Text] On one of the submarine's ocean cruises, water began leaking into one of its compartments. The situation was complicated by the fact that the saline moisture could cause certain life-support devices to break down. Captain 3rd Rank S. Kubynin, a graduate of our school, defused the situation. Possessing excellent physical and mental conditioning, he eliminated the problem, the senior chief subsequently noted during the investigation. This was due mainly to the good professional training and physical conditioning of the fightingmen.

I frequently tell about this incident during my classes with the cadets. It also caused me to think about the need to restructure the physical training of the future naval commanders, to bring it into conformity with the demands of modern naval combat and with the specific nature of the work performed by the sailors.

Outwardly, the situation at our school would appear to be entirely as it should be. The graduating cadets received higher scores for physical training than for the other disciplines. There were those who passed these tests with difficulty, to be sure. One automatically asks oneself whether Cadets A. Shkil, R. Ivanov and E. Bimeyev could have done just what Officer Kubynin did in the submarine compartment if they found themselves in that situation. Personally, I have my doubts, because it is not enough merely to want to do it. Proper skills, psychological and physical mobilization of will and nerves are required for determined action.

The simplest thing, of course, would be to accuse the above-named cadets of not being active enough in their independent physical training. One could cite a large number of factors which would exonerate us instructors in the physical training department. Decisions coming out of the 27th party congress orient us not to seek causes and justifications, however, but to reveal reserves for making the work more effective. We demandingly assessed the results of our work, for which purpose we studied, analyzed and summarized the performance of our graduates who are now serving on combat ships.

And this is what we learned: there is a certain lack of conformity of the training programs to the missions being performed by the navy today in all latitudes of the World Ocean. Certain young officers, particularly submariners, have to start from the beginning, as they say, when they arrive on the ships. Experience has shown that the physical training classes today need to be conducted in a comprehensive manner, including in the program those types of sports and exercises with applied importance. Strength-testing exercises must be combined with the cross-country event during the rapid-movement exercises, for example. In order to prepare the future commanders for combat operations in situations involving the employment of weapons of mass destruction, some of the exercises should be made more complex by going through them in the personal protective gear. The physical training of the future naval officers is not an end in itself but a means of helping to develop practical skills.

The same can be said of exercises on the naval obstacle course. That traditional naval element of the physical training, rowing, is gradually dying out. Just where is the future officer to develop naval skills, to build up his resistance to the physical strain, the rolling caused by storms and other adverse factors on naval cruises?

The increased complexity of the missions performed by the sailors today urgently demands an increase in the amount of time allocated for the physical training of cadets at naval schools.

We once analyzed the causes of the poor progress of certain cadets. We learned that the weakest performers consisted mainly of so-called "Olympians." Captain 1st Rank V. Kazantsev's men received one third of the low scores in the last examination session, for example.

The cause of this phenomenon, which took root long ago not just at our school, should be sought in the harmful practice of assessing the performance of the physical training departments not from the way in which the graduates serve in the navy but from the number of records and victories in various competitions. Our athletes have taken leading places, for example. The department is afloat then. But no, none of the accomplishments count.

In connection with this, it would be fitting to mention also the financial aspect of the "prestige" sports. The funds spent at our school alone on trips by large composite teams to participate in sports festivals at the Navy's educational institutions, which, incidentally, have been conducted since 1978, could have been used to acquire trainers and to renovate the gymnasium.

I can also cite the following data: thousands of training hours and hours of self-preparation--this is more time than the members of the composite teams participating in the Navy's sports festivals at the Navy's educational institutions have spent on their main work.

There is yet another aspect of this matter. The sports festivals involve six different sports, and officers in the physical training department are charged with responsibility for training and putting together the composite teams. Almost all of our time is therefore spent organizing and traveling to those competitions.

In my opinion, it would be fairly easy to solve this problem. What about evaluating the performance of the physical training departments not from the results of the sports festivals and exhibition but on the basis of how our graduates perform their duties--during their first year as officers, let us say? Let the commissions set up for the inspections and exhibitions of mass sports work visit the fleets and test the physical training of the lieutenants on a selective basis, and everything will become clear. Every department would receive its deserved evaluation for its main "product," its graduate, whose physical conditioning must be oriented not toward records but toward the successful accomplishment of the combat training tasks.

I in no way object to preparing athletically talented and gifted cadets for competitions, of course. Their know-how and skill must be a sort of foundation upon which their overall success is based, however, and certainly not the opposite. What do we have, though? A desire to achieve records motivates certain officers to engage in various kinds of machinations. They have a powerful drive to achieve "winning" points and performance, for example. I do not believe that Lieutenant Colonel G. Ushakov, chief of the Physical Training Department at the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, taught his students the best of lessons in indoctrination by altering his team's time for a swimming relay at one of the recent sports festivals.

It is also in the interest of combat readiness to improve the physical training facilities themselves, to build trainers by means of which the future naval officers can develop the qualities essential in the service. Effective equipment is installed on the modern ships for developing in the sailors the ability to withstand the adverse factors of long ocean cruises and drastic climatic changes. One can only regret the fact that our graduates come into contact with this equipment only after they begin serving, since it does not exist at the school.

The Pacific Fleet has received ships and submarines outfitted with training complexes for physical training classes in recent years, for example. How are our graduates to organize classes for their men with this equipment if they have not seen it before?

The problems of navy sports are a result primarily of the development of military affairs and the increased complexity of the tasks performed by the sailors today. And the correct thing to do would be to reorganize and renew the physical training not from the standpoint of records but in the interest of the combat readiness, which is also the interest of our homeland's security. Only this should be the main criterion for assessing the physical and the moral-psychological conditioning of the cadets.

11499

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NAVAL FORCES

OFFICERS' EXAMPLE CITED AS KEY TO GOOD DISCIPLINE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 86 p 13

Article by Captain 1st Rank G. Gorbunov: "No Right To Indulge -- Military Discipline: An Officer's Example"]

[Text] When Captain 3rd Rank V. Ovchinnikov who had just completed the Higher Special Officers Naval Course was selected to command a nuclear submarine, people in the force saw it as the right thing to do. Despite his young age (it is very likely that there has never been a younger commander), everyone knew that Ovchinnikov possessed marked command qualities in every respect. He was an excellent sailor, had conducted torpedo firing at the "excellent" level and possessed an enviable memory and fast reactions. And as is especially important, he was able to rally people around him, infecting his subordinates with selflessness and setting an example for them in all respects.

We had completed classes together, but had then served in different organizations. And suddenly, like a clap of thunder on a clear day, we were read the order which stated that Captain 3rd Rank Ovchinnikov, the commander of a submarine that was lagging behind its contemporaries, had been severely punished. A little later we heard the order removing him from his position. Remember, this crew had never been one of the best and had spent a long time working up to the norm. Military discipline there was at an extremely low level. And this was the fault of no one but the commander himself. He was talented, energetic and demanding and had allowed himself only one fault -- he began to drink.

The commander's weakness had an immediately effect on the entire collective. First, the worth of those surrounding the commander was re-evaluated. He had begun to find more and more hangers-on who were ready to indulge him, rather than people who had principles and were really business-like and strict. Second, the commander's prestige fell in the eyes of sailors. His negative example shook their faith in the rigidity of military discipline.

This officer's susceptibility to alcohol is an obvious weakness that is incompatible with his service position. It's irreconcilability with the service is natural, for it has a very negative effect on the service and the education of subordinates. But there are also other weaknesses which officers allow themselves and which may not be as evident, but which have repercussions

among subordinates, weaken their self-discipline and undermine the foundation of military discipline. During my navy service I have been convinced more than once that one must be able to see the ripple of one's own errors in the conduct and errors of subordinates and must carefully analyze one's own business-like approach, service qualities and level of self-discipline.

I remember that we once took over a ship whose equipment was in excellent shape. A well-trained crew would have no problem keeping this equipment at the required level and so, relying on this, I began to have a somewhat formal attitude toward my regulatory duties involved in the ship's daily operations. My motivation for doing this was well-intentioned: the time that I saved was to be used for other urgent matters. At times I allowed myself to skip my rounds and I sometimes conducted them in an abbreviated fashion, relying on my subordinates' conscientiousness, honesty and level of discipline. However the sailors reached a very unexpected conclusion from this: when the commander has lost his zealotry toward monitoring the condition of the equipment, one can also be less diligent toward it. A senior chief soon visited the ship, carefully went around to the compartments and, after first demanding that we immediately eliminate the discrepancies, gave us a poor rating for our submarine maintenance.

We eliminated the trouble with an all-hands formation. And although there were specific people who were guilty in each individual case, I had to admit that the major error was mine. It wasn't easy to make up for the omissions. We quickly brought order to the ship, but were not able to immediately eliminate the psychological self-indulgence among some of the submariners.

Here is another example. Relationships in the crew somehow began to upset us. It had not reached the point of serious problems, but there had been more and more cases of rudeness and disrespectful attitudes among sailors, petty officers and, yes, officers. We spent a lot of time with the zompolit [deputy commander for political affairs] trying to find out what was causing this. It was more than just familiarity. It was possible that the cause was that, through an old habit, I frequently address many people and especially sailors in the "ty" form. Honesty suggested that it was sometimes more natural and sincere to address a sailor in this fashion. But at the same time, it turns out that this was, albeit unnoticeably, weakening some of the restraining element in the interrelationships among people. Their tone was changing and becoming coarser.

Unfortunately we do not always go to the trouble of pondering over problems such as this. People say that these are trifles, like sharp words which are sometimes used to "create an impression." In fact, these "trifles" were undermining the true regulatory nature of interrelationships and were legitimizing weaknesses in the exactingness that people were making on one another. It is easy for a commander to give some slack in this area, but it is more difficult to take the slack up later.

We sometimes honestly think that subordinates must be clearly aware of the boundary between themselves and the commander. People say that there are times when one person is allowed to do something when another may not. An officer comes out of the ward room with his coat unbuttoned and it turns out

to be the commander. And people feel that they then have the right to take liberties with their uniform. But of course it is psychologically natural for subordinates to pattern themselves after their chief, imitate and copy him. And of course it is easier to imitate someone who lets himself do things the easy way. For example, it is more difficult to increase demands on yourself than it is to let yourself relax, justifying your actions by the example set by the chief.

Every officer understands that strengthening regulatory order and discipline among his subordinates is one of his most important tasks. And every officer strives for this in one way or another. But the mechanism for actually achieving command exactingness begins to operate effectively only when an officer steadfastly supports the stated level of action through his personal example and flawlessly follows that which he is forcing others to do. Such an officer immediately comes into the chief's view and, as they say, is invaluable. But these strong points in people are usually associated with weak points. A commander can rely only on subordinates who irreproachably strengthen military discipline. And people must consistently and constantly struggle for this irreproachability

Captain-Lieutenant G. Yakushin was assigned to our crew. As it later turned out, he was given a promotion so that his unit could get rid of an officer who had had a lot of trouble. (Unfortunately one still runs into this practice.) Outwardly Yakushin made a favorable impression. Yet he had a single, but very serious shortcoming -- he was careless. Regardless of what he was assigned, he would "put on the brakes" and always find justifiable reasons for not completing his assigned task. People in the collective soon recognized this and this officer's prestige fell radically. Yakushin had come to us as a candidate for CPSU membership, but a party meeting rejected his party membership application. Yakushin would have been part of the problem in and of himself, but because he was a division commander he had many subordinates. Who would educate them for him? Affairs in the division soon began to slide, especially in the area of military discipline. Sailors began to have the same "sin" as their commander: they began to get careless and so became the weak link in the crew.

I became convinced long ago during my command experience that it did no good to "turn the screws" in such cases. It is difficult to force a man to carry out his duties conscientiously. People begin to work studiously and with initiative when they learn to gain satisfaction from their work. We spent a lot of time, effort and attention on the Captain-Lieutenant. The main thing was that, in recognizing his own weaknesses, he had lost heart. It was all the same to him whether he earned prestige among his subordinates. But Yakushin was mistaken. After noticing changes in the officer, the sailors began to actively support him. They did not want their commander to be worse than others. And when he became established and had accustomed himself to the crew, they began to be proud of him. Yakushin was promoted to the next higher military rank and did well. And to date he still has good standing among submariners.

The officer collective helped a comrade and, to a lesser degree, itself. It showed itself that it had strength, solidarity and ability to strengthen

itself. In fact, general authority is gained through the achievements of individual people. And a commander is really strong when he is able to rely on every officer.

As in any naval formation, we have also had commanders who were remembered long after they had left their ships. They finished their ship-board duty long ago, yet their earlier example still served the sailors and worked for the good of the formation. These were certainly exemplary commanders who distinguished themselves through their excellent personal qualities and their ability to work with people. For example, Captain 1st Rank A. Dudchenko remains a favorite in the memories of the officers and all the personnel. Captain R. Leontyev very quickly took any crew to the foremost level. Captain Yu. Bystrov (now a rear admiral) was able to get unusual solidarity, discipline and selflessness from his subordinates.

The reconstruction that the navy is now undergoing demands that commanders at all levels apply very high, extreme party fundamentals in everything that they do for the sake of this business. It is impossible to make decisive gains in further strengthening military discipline without this. Here is a perfect example of this. There was a gross misdemeanor in a major Northern Fleet submarine unit. A sailor from the crew of a personnel ship reported it. The unit commander, his staff and political section conducted a thorough inspection of the ship and discovered several more gross misdemeanors. The commander immediately reported them up the chain of command. This unit had been successfully vying for the rank of "Best in the Navy" and the unit commander understood that his ship had now lost all hope of attaining that high rank. But this did not shake his determination.

The navy command estimated the officer's principles at their true worth, but the main thing is that he had strengthened the command's faith that this unit commander would strive to complete the goals assigned to him. The guarantee for this was his prestige among his subordinates and the convincing example of high personal exactingness and principles that he set.

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NAVAL FORCES

DESCRIPTION, SKETCH OF SAET-50 TORPEDO

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 86 p 13

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Ye. Kuzmin and reserve Colonel V. Knyazkov: "The Torpedo"]


[Text] It is now clear that a well-prepared torpedo attack cannot be avoided. A ship would hardly be able to maneuver to escape the torpedo. The fuse which is charged 300-400 meters from the launch tube is immediately set off by the effects of inertial force and this detonates the explosive material located in the warhead section.

What happens when a torpedo with an impressive mass (on the order of 7454 mm in length, 530 mm in diameter and a weight of more than 1600 kilograms) strikes the side of a ship below the waterline? Here is an example. We know that the TM-46 anti-tank mine has 5.7 kilograms of explosives. And there is good reason to call this an anti-tank mine, for it can incapacitate a powerful tank weighing several dozen tons. And the warhead of the SAET-50 torpedo has 375 kilograms of explosives. Imagine 65 anti-tank mines actually placed in a single charge!

There is one more refinement in the fuse: this torpedo has a non-contact fuse. This means that it is not a total miss if the torpedo begins to pass below the ship's bottom. The fuse is set off if the torpedo dives to within five meters of the ship's bottom. A schematic of the fuse operation is as follows: the electromagnetic field of the torpedo interacts with the electromagnetic field of the ship and is distorted. This causes a signal which triggers the execution relays, the electric primer, and then the charge.


The inventory of Soviet naval ships and aviation includes improved types of long-range anti-ship torpedoes. Moreover, the contemporary level of military equipment has allowed us to reach an original engineering solution: a missile is combined with a torpedo and the result is an heretofore unprecedented weapon -- the rocket-torpedo.

The rocket-torpedo is launched from a ship many kilometers from the target. It is launched like a conventional missile and in this case, the torpedo is essentially a warhead, or as the specialists put it, a warhead with a payload. The missile very quickly delivers the torpedo to the assigned area



THE SAET-50 ELECTRICAL TORPEDO

I - Warhead; II - battery compartment; III - afterbody; IV - tail; 1 -- acoustic homing mechanism; 2 -- explosive material; 3 -- exploder mechanism; 4 -- batteries; 5 -- electric motor; 6 -- starting mechanism; 7 -- depth mechanism; 8 -- gyro mechanism; 9 -- vertical rudder; 10 -- forward propeller; 11 -- after propeller; 12 -- horizontal rudder; 13 -- compressed air flasks (bottles); 14 -- starter.



of the sea. Then the torpedo separates from the missile at the assigned location, dives into the ocean and begins moving toward the designated objective.

The torpedo is a reliable and formidable weapon in a sea battle and one of the most important tasks for military sailors is to work constantly during the days of military training to improve their skills in torpedo firing against different targets and learn to destroy targets with the first shot and at the maximum range.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

CONCERNS OF CHIEF OF CHEMICAL SERVICE

Moscow VOYENNIY VESTNIK in Russian No 11, Nov 86 pp 85-87

[Article by Colonel B. Shubin: "The Concerns of the Chief of Chemical Service"]

[Text] As is known, excellent field training and strong military discipline in personnel is reached through the joint and purposeful work of commanders and political workers, staff officers and specialists in the various services. The content and nature of the tasks that they resolve on a daily basis are different, but they all serve the general goals, like links in a single chain. The successes and shortcomings of every one of them has an unavoidable impact on the end results of the subunit and unit as a whole.

Chemical service officers are called upon to make an important contribution to the business of training personnel to operate clearly and in a well-organized manner in modern battle. Their role is especially great when the enemy is using weapons of mass destruction. For example, the functional duties of the regimental chief of chemical service as contained in the regulations are especially multi-faceted. First and foremost, in peacetime he strives to develop qualitative measures to reliably support subunit operations and to protect them from toxic and radioactive agents and also enemy biological weapons; and he works to effectively employ these measures in battle.

The majority of chemical officers have a good understanding of the importance associated with this mission and have a conscientious attitude toward their service and party duty. The selfless actions that many of them displayed while eliminating the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant testify to their high political, business and moral qualities. Officers N. Vybodovskiy, S. Golovko, V. Reznichenko, Ye. Starostin, A. Toporkov, N. Shevchenko, S. Shishko and many others did an exceptional job and distinguished themselves. They boldly entered the struggle against the enraged elements at this hour of need, quickly discerned the radiation problem in the area around the station and conduct radioactive decontamination operations, thus providing a bridgehead for the work in eliminating the ruinous consequences of terrain contamination in the danger zone. Military chemical personnel also did an excellent job in resolving the other difficult tasks involved in dosimetric monitoring of the radioactive contamination in people, livestock and various types of equipment.

At the same time, reality is showing that some, and especially recently assigned chiefs of chemical service, are allowing important omissions in planning military and political training and are not providing skillful assistance to subunit commanders in setting up exercises and training. And they also often do a poor job in monitoring the course of the training process and the monitoring the condition and use of protective gear. The reasons for this are more than just their poor professional skills. It is also the low sense of responsibility that the officers have for their assigned tasks and in some it is their adherence to outdated methods for managing their service.

In order to generalize the foremost experience I would like to go into some detail in relating the work of Major G. Logvinov (from the North Caucasus Military District) who is the best regimental chief of chemical service in one of the formations. This industrious, energetic, well-trained officer enjoys well-deserved authority in the collective. In a relatively short time he has been able to significantly correct the situation in the sector of work that has been entrusted to him.

The subunit that is directly subordinate to the chief of chemical service achieved good and excellent marks in the socialist competition that was dedicated to the 27th CPSU Congress. And training in defense against weapons of mass destruction in many of the regiment's subunits was marked by definite successes this year. The best of them was the tank battalion commanded by officer G. Kozhekhov. It is generally recognized that a lot of this is due to the new chief of chemical service.

One cannot say that Logvinov's predecessor was not a conscientious officer. During his time of service he received a lot of incentives and did not receive a single punishment, but earlier there was no one in the regiment who was interested in the problems of chemical defense. The command and the party organization did not get very involved in the work of the chemical service, considering this the prerogative of specialists. Apparently the final satisfactory results in ZOMP [defense against weapons of mass destruction] that were attained at inspections satisfied them.

Major Logvinov took over the service on the eve of the training year. The officer began by carefully studying documentation from the previous final inspections and the appropriate notes in the military training journal. He made a comprehensive analysis of the positive aspects and the deficiencies in ZOMP training for regimental subunits and in all areas of the chemical defense platoon's training. This allowed him to note specific and real measures in generalizing and introducing progressive experience and in eliminating omissions and deficiencies in training personnel.

The chief of chemical service took an active part in the work involved in planning military and political training. The primary goal that he worked for was an expedient consistency in developing ZOMP subjects with commissioned and warrant officers and sergeants and with subunits and the efficient use of the material and technical training base.

During the planning process the chief of chemical service determined the volume and length of time for developing chemical support missions in concert with the primary issues in tactical training exercises and in other training. He further planned the sequence for getting subunits involved in chemical defense in joint exercises and training with tankers and artillery men.

Subjects and times were also set up to have company and platoon commanders involved with displays and methodological instructor training in ZOMP. Training in the most difficult subjects was established for warrant officers and sergeants. Major Logvinov developed documentation for the chemical defense platoon in accordance with the established requirements for planning military and political training and also developed documentation for special exercises with battalion chemical instructors, as well as with the crews (squads, teams) that were designated to conduct radiation and chemical reconnaissance.

The chief of chemical service simultaneously provided battalion commanders and chiefs of staff with specific assistance in planning and setting up ZOMP exercises. They were specifically given recommendations on the decontamination sequence which considered the efficient use of equipment in training classrooms, the tactical fields of the chemical training ground and the areas near the barracks that were set up for training. When required, special equipment, instruments for radiation and chemical reconnaissance, radiation and chemical decontamination sets, simulators, and incendiary and smoke equipment, placards, stands and other mobile training equipment were set up there at the assigned time.

Major Logvinov helped subunit commanders write exercise schedules, correctly organize the development of ZOMP norms and conduct training for personal in the prolonged use of gas masks and protective garments. By the way, the regiment began to more fully utilize time from field exercises for such training and it also displaced to training locations to train and then returned to the barracks. As a result, they succeeded in improving the psychological and physical tempering of the personnel.

The chief of chemical service sees one of his primary missions as increasing the effectiveness of exercises in defense against weapons of mass destruction and teaching subunit commanders to conduct such exercises in a manner that is methodologically correct. Displays and instructor-methodological exercises are routinely set up, especially on such subjects and issues as using the protective characteristics of terrain and organic equipment, the means of individual and collective protection, the conduct of radiation and chemical reconnaissance, methods and means for operating in contaminated terrain and others.

Future exercise instructors receive a clear representation of which defensive issues should be developed in a squad, platoon or company, which should be dealt with in the classroom, on equipped training areas or tactical training fields, and which trainers, simulators and technical equipment are best used to avoid artificiality in operations by personnel and so forth.

Instructor-methodological exercises usually have a practical side. Company, platoon or squad commanders execute methods or means as determined by the subject to protect against weapons of mass destruction. But at the same time instructors explain how to set up competition for the best accomplishment of norms in ZOMP exercises at their own subunits and how to get their personnel to develop psychological and physical stability, self-sufficiency, courage and solid skills in rendering self- and first-aid to wounded, as well as in the use of protective means and anti-radiation preparation.

For example, during one of the methodological exercises Major Logvinov recommended to officers that when teaching their subordinates how to operate in case of an enemy chemical attack they should give the established signals, primarily through subunit observers so that the students who are carrying out tactical or fire missions do not expect these signals. Based on the specific situation, crew commanders must refine the sequence for applying protective means. At the same time, soldiers who have been prepared beforehand can open envelopes that have been passed out to them and imitate the first symptoms of a disease as described in their envelop. Their comrades must detect these symptoms in a timely fashion and correctly provide first aid.

The chief of chemical service further explained how the activities of the students should be monitored and evaluated. The best crew in this case is determined by three factors: the decision's expedience and the sergeant's commands; the timeliness and correctness of donning protective and the effectiveness of the antidote that is selected and other self-help methods.

If the exercise then requires that weapons and military equipment be designated as contaminated by enemy toxic agents, then it is useful to do this, observing (and demonstrating) certain precautionary measures. It is advisable to mark the drops of the imitation toxic agent mixture that are on the material parts while wearing a gas mask and protective clothing and remaining some distance from the students. It would seem that even this simple methodological method has a certain psychological effect on soldiers. As a result they are usually more careful in decontaminating equipment and are more watchful of their own safety.

Major Logvinov usually shows special care that chemical support issues are constantly developed in tactical exercises and subunit training. He takes an active part in devising exercise plans and assists instructors in setting up an integrated mixture of measures to protect against toxic agents and radioactive substances and to demonstrate the use of smoke and incendiary devices to successfully accomplish missions.

One company training exercises included an attack from the march against a prepared "enemy" defense. At the initiative of the chief of chemical service the plan for the attack included: personnel operating in a form-up area with dangerous radioactive contamination, a smoke screen to protect personnel from well-aimed fire on the advance, a chemical air attack on the company march column deep in its defensive position and full decontamination using the technical means from the chemical defense platoon. Thus one or two chemical support issues were developed at every stage of the exercise.

Before the subunit went out to the field the chief of chemical service personally inspected the presence and condition of their individual protective gear, radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments and tank decontamination instruments and conducted training with the crew that the company had trained to conduct that reconnaissance. The officer analyzed any deficiencies that were detected during his address to the company Komsomol meeting. He also refined the tasks of qualitatively developing chemical support issues at the up-coming training and then in the exercise. A battalion chemical instructor was assigned to successfully resolve them.

The chief of chemical service assisted the training instructor create a difficult radiation and chemical situation, prepare and carry out the necessary simulation of terrain and equipment contamination and develop the planned issues in an instructive manner under conditions that approached combat. As a result personnel improved the skills that they have to have to operate successfully in battle.

The feeling of responsibility for his assigned area that communist Logvinov has developed is not only reflected in his conscientious accomplishment of certain functional regulatory duties. He is constantly looking for creative ways to further improve regimental officer and personnel training within his specialty. Any problem involved in improving chemical service that the officer cannot resolve through his own efforts he bravely elevates to the command and party organization. And since his recommendations are always clear, completely thought-out and well-founded, as a rule they are totally supported.

For example, at the chief of chemical service's initiative the plan for the independent work that officers do with service literature now includes many new problems involved in protecting subunits from contemporary means of armed conflicts. Logvinov always carefully follows newly published regulations, manuals, training material and periodicals in his own service and often comes out with examples of these. He found the time to talk with officers who were doing individual work and he assisted them in including various chemical support problems in their work.

During the course of tactical and command-and-staff exercises the chief of chemical service does not wait for instructions from above, but rather independently tries to assist the regimental commander and chief of staff and other officers in guaranteeing the survivability of subunits when the enemy is employing weapons of mass destruction. His recommendations are usually specific, business-like, tactically sound and closely related to the specific work of the officials.

The chief of chemical service focuses special attention on officers, warrant officers and also regimental subunits which, according to reviews of the past year and graded exercises conducted during the winter period, have insufficient ZOMP training. He tries to meet with them more often, systematically monitor them and give them more assistance in mastering the necessary knowledge and skills. His exactingness and persistence are always combined with kindness and sensitivity in his relationship with colleagues and

with the ability to convince them of the necessity of continuously improving themselves.

The chief of chemical service's prestige is to a great degree based on his active participation in party and political work and the social life of the regiment. He regularly speaks at party and Komsomol meetings and holds conversations with personnel not only in his own specialty, but also on issues of military education, socialist competition and supporting strict regulatory order in subunits.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

REPORT VIEWS WORK OF MILITARY ACADEMY

PM050925 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 3

[Special correspondent N. Sautin report under the rubric "Soviet Armed Forces' Life": "Leaders Are Not Born...Reportage from the General Staff Military Academy"]

[Excerpts] ...I entered the office of Army General Grigoriy Ivanovich Salmanov, chief of the academy. There were three tables. He was working at the desk. Every morning the adjutant brings sheaves of books and journals--the latest military literature, both domestic and foreign. Behind a wide table beside the wall hang large maps of the most important salients. Salmanov began the Great Patriotic War as a platoon commander. After the war he commanded a regiment, division, army, district... For several years he was the main military adviser in Afghanistan.

"Soviet military strategy," Grigoriy Ivanovich immediately explains, "reflects CPSU and government policy in the sphere of the country's defense. You know, of course, that our military doctrine is a defensive doctrine. Our academy's fundamental scientific works are devoted to the questions of repulsing aggression. Implemented in military life, these works improve the Armed Forces' combat readiness to thwart aggression and rout the enemy in any situation. While the threat of war exists we must keep our powder dry..."

"Who studies at your place?"

"Not my place--the academy," the general corrected me. "We take generals and officers who have graduated from military academies and shown their worth in positions of command. Each has around 20 years military experience. Consequently their average age is around 40. They come here as tankmen, pilots, and sailors... And they leave as combined arms servicemen able to independently plan and command defensive and, if necessary, offensive operations at the operational formation scale. Let me say a few words about the training process. It is aimed at creatively interpreting the nature of modern warfare. Stock solutions are not welcomed. At a time when nuclear missile weapons are being improved and computers extensively utilized, the derivation of readymade solutions from the experience of the past will not lead to success. Theory is backed up by practice at command

post exercises, troop maneuvers, and practical training with the troops. The students study for 2 years. Then, as stipulated, they defend their thesis and take their final examinations. They are then assigned to the troops, the Navy, the General Staff, central administrations of the USSR Defense Ministry..."

The academy's corridors have a museum-like feel about them with their magnificent bronze busts of those who have brought fame to the fatherland's weapons. It is quiet. Lessons are under way. I half-open the door to one of the lecture halls.

"...Seeking new troop command methods, the High Command started sending to the front representatives who were authorized to independently solve fundamental questions on the spot. Those who went most often to the front were: Zhukov 12 times, Vasilevskiy 12 times, Voronov 5 times, Timoshenko 4 times, and Voroshilov 3 times..."

Major General Leonid Sergeyevich Zolotov is lecturing on "The System and Means of Leading the Armed Struggle." In the next lecture hall they are analyzing the fighting strength of operational formations in the last war. It is almost 50 years since the Great Patriotic War started, but the experience of those distant battles is still being learned today. We pass classes where there are lectures on the probable enemy's armies, military economics, questions of defending the population and rear units in the country against enemy means of attack, and the mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces.

We pass a nameplate stating "Faculty of Military Strategy." There is no other faculty of this type in any other educational establishment. It is headed by Colonel General Vitaliy Nikolayevich Karpov.

The academy conducts research on supporting military operations in the light of the development of weapons and military hardware. The probable enemy's views on conducting military operations on an operational-strategic scale are thoroughly analyzed.

But how can the academy's students rehearse "questions of repulsing aggression" in practice? We entered an operational formation training control post with Colonel General Professor Petr Kirillovich Altukhov, chief of the Troop Control Faculty. While the officers were preparing the lecture hall for the exercise, I asked him to discuss the details of a modern operation on this scale.

"The equipping of the Armed Forces with nuclear weapons, the introduction of electronics and nuclear power units, and the complete motorization and mechanization of the troops," the professor said, "has immeasurably increased their combat capabilities. The complexion of the operation has changed too. It may include nuclear strikes alongside battles and engagements. New types of operational support have emerged--protecting troops from weapons of mass destruction and from electronic means. The first, surprise, resolute operation typified by great breadth of scope, massive

strikes, and the use of many branches of the Armed Forces is of decisive importance. It is this first, secretly prepared strike that the aggressor is counting on. The faculty's work is aimed at developing ways of ensuring continuous stable control of troops and weapons under conditions of active electronic warfare. And that is impossible without automated control systems and computers. They are to today's military leader what the submachinegun is to the soldier."

The students sit down at the automated "control" workstations. The "commander" this time is Colonel Gennadiy Borisovich Vasilyev, honored military pilot of the USSR. Colonel Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev is a "member of the Military Council." The academy's youngest student--35-year-old Colonel Vladimir Ilich Isakov--will be the "chief of staff."

I will deliberately omit details--difficult to understand for the uninitiated--of the operation to "rout the aggressor." I will only describe the external aspects of the command "trio's" work. They face a display. The "commander" orders the operator officer to "call up" on screen the fighting strength of the attacking "enemy." This information is already in the memory and is updated with the help of intelligence. The screen displays a bar chart showing the number of nuclear charges, data on field artillery, helicopters... Another order is given and columns of data relating to "our" forces flash up. The "commander" is dissatisfied with something. He sharply tells the operator:

"Correlate!"

And the display "reports" that in terms of some kinds of equipment and arms the correlation does not favor the defenders. Adjustments in forces and means are made with the help of the electronics. Another screen is displaying complex graphs. The situation is already being studied in a number of dimensions.

The operator models a counterstrike against the aggressor. Attention again centers on the display. What is the correlation in the zone of the offensive? What is the depth of penetration, what will be the losses...

"Show day 2 of the operation!"

The equipment is even able to view the second day of the battle. Colonel Vasilyev is satisfied by the picture. "Military Council member" Nikolayev proposes introducing reserves. The proposal is accepted. Day 3 is modeled, then day 4... With the computer's help various operational scenarios are played out taking account of the "surprises" that the "enemy" might spring. The flashing columns of figures on the screen represent hundreds of tanks, missiles, fighters, and guns. And tens of thousands of people... But can their military skill, desire for victory, and fearlessness be programmed? No, man will still have the last word.

Finally the "commander" decides to approve the "battle" plan. Now it is the lecturers' turn: Analysis of the exercise begins.

You will ask: Where is the element of "battle"?! Where are the nonstandard decisions and the revealed secrets of the military leaders' "trade" come from? And was the "aggressor routed"? I forgot to warn you that Vasilyev, Nikolayev, and Isakov are first-year students. They are currently rehearsing the topic "Preparing for an Operation." They have yet to learn how to win a dynamic battle. And not only for their academy examinations...

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MILITARY HISTORY

IMPORTANCE OF STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Khorkov, Doctor of Historical Sciences and editor-in-chief of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL: "Meeting the Specific Needs of Practice"]

[Text] It is the nature of our people to have a deep interest in the past and in historical values. Interest in these areas--and this is a characteristic trait of the times--is increasing. History, and especially military history, attracts both the elderly and the young. Generals and officers thoroughly examine operations and battles in order to put into practice what they have gained from their experience.

But at the same time, we have to be realists. There are officers who do not know our military history very well, including the events of the Great Patriotic War. And these officers must know military history, for it is the experience of the past and not so distant past. This experience, which has and continues to support Soviet military science as well as army and navy experience, is a reliable foundation for the development of contemporary military affairs.

The CPSU Central Committee political report to the 27th Party Congress noted that there is an urgent need for intense historical research. And there is this same need for basic military historical research. Military history is educating Soviet people in the historical examples of the past and is enriching the army and navy cadres with knowledge and experience in setting up combat operations. This is extremely important under contemporary conditions when people who have not participated in combat operations are taking over the leadership of the military from those who took part in the Civil War and Great Patriotic War.

The importance of military historical work today is also increasing, for as the Armed Forces are acquiring complicated military equipment and the need for force combat readiness is increasing, the tasks of training and educating personnel are becoming more difficult. This assumes a more thorough study and effective use of the experience that has been accumulated in the post-war period. Skillfully organized military historical work, the comprehensive study of the experience of past wars and also of present local wars and

military conflicts, as well as the experience of maneuvers and training assists in more correctly resolving the urgent problems of improving our Armed Forces.

Finally, military history was and continues to be an area of extremely intense ideological conflict. Bourgeois ideologists are persistently attempting to distort the reasons for the Second World War and are doing everything possible to falsify its results and lessons.

All of this demands a decided improvement in military historical work, an access to new, expanded frontiers of knowledge and the means for effectively putting that knowledge into practice.

The achievements of Soviet military historical science are well-known. They have received wide recognition and are providing the appropriate practical effect.

Military historical work in the Armed Forces includes an extensive array of measures that are being carried out in the forces, military training schools and military scientific institutions. This work is a powerful lever in the activities of commanders, political agencies and headquarters to increase the quality of personnel training and education.

Without belittling the achievements in military historical work, I can and must state that it still does not totally meet the demands that are being made.

I have had to become very familiar with the military historical works and dissertations of the past. What has struck me in a number of cases is the fact that their subjects and content are so isolated from the practical needs of the army and navy. These works have not always had a deep and concrete analysis of the work that general officers, commanders and staffs did during the Great Patriotic War to prepare for and conduct combat operations and command their forces. And they have not always covered experiences in operational and combat training in the post-war period. New problems are presented and developed in a timid fashion. Also several of these military historical works are not at a high enough scientific or theoretical level.

When illuminating the problems of the history of military art, some authors keep to the beaten path and focus their attention on Great Patriotic War operations that are already widely known.

There are times when the prime consideration in the plans for scientific activities is not developing the most important military historical problems, those problems whose importance is due to contemporary missions, but rather producing books, texts and monographs, many of which are to a great degree a repetition of books that have been previously written.

And the military historical work that is being done in higher military schools is still not totally satisfying. At times this work is reduced to lectures and seminars on the history of war and on military art. And there are times when its importance in formulating and developing the strategic and tactical

outlook of students and cadets and indoctrinating them with the heroic traditions of the past is underestimated. The hours devoted to this discipline are being reduced in some training institutions. "Military History" and "The history of Military (Naval) Art" are taught primarily in a descriptive, and not problematic, manner. The specifics of the profile for training students and cadets of arms and branches of service are not sufficiently considered.

And as far as military historical work directly in the forces is concerned, there are times when this is not linked to plans for operational, combat and political training. This work is often reduced to anniversary-type activities. It is not systematic or purposeful enough. Some supervisors underestimate the importance of military historical work and lack sufficient skills in setting it up, conducting it and using its results to improve the quality of operational and combat training.

Let's analyze some exercises. Is the experience that has been accumulated in the past always utilized in these? Unfortunately there are few specific references to what the experience of battles teaches. For example, why is it that when students are working out a method for an operation such as an encirclement, there is no comprehensive discussion about how such operations were conducted at Minsk during the Belorussian Operation of 1944? The benefit from such a discussion would be immense.

Here is one fact that shows how past experiences are valued. Last year during Kavkaz-85 subunits battled behind a mountain pass, made a river assault crossing and worked out mutual support problems. One thing that facilitated success was that even during the preparatory phase for the exercise the instructor, the commander of the district's forces, focused his staff officers' attention on carefully studying and envisioning using the experience of combat operations in mountainous and semi-desert terrain that was accumulated during the Great Patriotic War. There was a specific recommendation that they review the most instructive features of the battles for the liberation of the Caucasus. The exercise that was held showed that military historical experience is very valuable in training staffs, units and subunits.

And it is disturbing that not all districts have as yet completed the work of writing the historical works covering the war-years of the units, ships and major units that took part in the Great Patriotic War. Entries in the historical journals (books) of some units were irregular and do not reflect the results of military and political training or the most important events that show the feats, valor and heroism of personnel in carrying out their patriotic and international duty. And these materials are a great help in the activities of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations.

There must be a decisive turn to the specific processes of army and navy life in order to elevate the level and effectiveness of military historical work. Military history should become a constantly factor in the operational and command training for officers and in the training and indoctrination of all service personnel. Life urgently demands that military historical work be

more closely associated with the contemporary tasks of military science and with the plans for operational, military and political training and that it be aimed at resolving practical issues.

Naturally we must approach the experience of the past creatively, for it is impossible to mechanically transfer yesterday's practices into today. But there is one thing that is beyond question -- we must be more decisive in making the transfer from the chronological clarification of military events to their comprehensive analysis and to the disclosure of their regularities and tendencies in developing military art. And we must focus more attention on lessons and conclusions. Naturally the USSR Ministry of Defense's Institute of Military History should set the tone in this area as it coordinates military historical research. Military academicians are doubtlessly starting off well as in addition to developing basic works, they are focusing their basic efforts on finding practical recommendations to solve the urgent problems of further strengthening the defensive capabilities of the USSR and developing military theory and policy, as well as constructing and training the Armed Forces.

It is well known that the benefits from scientific activities are not determined by the number of scientific research works or printed works or by the volume of monographs and reports that are developed, but by the real scientific achievements and new conclusions and by the introduction of new documents and facts into scientific circulation. Therefore we need a more careful approach for determining the themes of military historical works and also for establishing the quality and real value of candidate and doctoral dissertations. We also need to make more active use of these works in army and navy policy.

Without detracting from the study of the experiences of the Great Patriotic War, we must expand our research into the post-war development of Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of other countries and into the experience of combat operations in local wars. The methods for resolving these tasks are different for each military historical agency. But regardless of what specific or general problem they may be resolving, these agencies must be united by the desire to get the end result to the forces so that the fruits of this scientific work don't build up in local offices, but rather provide concrete assistance to commanders and political workers.

Military historical work in military academies and schools must be radically improved. It would be wrong to have the process of training students and cadets provided them only with sound knowledge about the history of wars and military art. They must also be taught to use this knowledge in their practical work.

And there are other problems. For example, in our opinion there is a need to develop a military history text for the Armed Forces service academies, to update and publish new maps, diagrams and training films and to produce slides on the basic themes for courses in military history and the history of military (naval) art that take program changes into account. There is also a need to publish popular books and brochures, illustrated albums and posters showing the historical development of weapons and military equipment. Of

course, the quality of these publications must be improved and increased demands must be made on the authors and author collectives of military historical works.

Military historical work is called upon to provide rich factual material for reaching creative conclusions, to promote growth in military knowledge, to expand the horizons of military cadre and also to assist commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations in cultivating combat-ready defenders of the Motherland.

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AFGHANISTAN

DRA GUERRILLAS USE U.S.-SUPPLIED 'CHEMICAL WEAPONS'

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Oct 86 p 3

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent M. Kozhukhov, Kabul, under the rubric "Exposure": "One Hundred Thousand Dollars for a Lie"]

[Text] From time to time the angry statement flashes across the pages of that "great free press" in the West: The Russians are using chemical weapons in Afghanistan! A lie of less than recent vintage? No problem: the ordinary person will swallow it. How would he know that for more than a couple of years now the Afghan "fighters for the faith" and their instructors, who do not believe in Allah, have attempted to prove the impossible?

The mouthpiece of professional mercenaries, the magazine SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, once promised 100,000 dollars to the person who could dig up proof that the Soviet Union is employing chemical ammunition. The dollars are still there, of course....

The West needs the lie about the USSR's use of chemical weapons in the battle against counterrevolution as a sort of veil to conceal from outsiders the irrefutable fact that the Western secret services have turned Afghan soil into a testing ground for new types of weapons. Including chemical weapons. This conclusion is taken from the book by American journalist Phillip Bonosky, "Washington's Secret War Against Afghanistan." According to his information, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has for several years now been supplying the dushmany [bandits] with ammunition filled with toxic substances.

The facts? These are the facts: Afghan soldiers seized chemical grenades containing the substance CS-517 in the area of Herat. The markings left no doubt as to their origin: "Made in the Soltsburg Federal Laboratories," Pennsylvania, USA." Shells containing M-12 tear gas were removed from a bandit depot in another province, Ghazni. A subunit of the Afghan army was subjected to a chemical attack in the province of Nangarhar in 1984.

At least twice Kabul has clinched its fists in indignation and rage: adolescents were the victims of Washington's chemical war against Afghanistan. In June of 1980 the dushmany poisoned 2,069 school children. Two years later poison was dumped into tanks containing the drinking water for one of the women's lycees. The result of the crime was 14 burials and dozens of people crippled.

A thing of the distant past? If only! Ammunition with a chemical charge is delivered to Afghanistan in the holds of transoceanic liners, by vehicle and then along clandestine caravan routes. For testing, so to speak.

Things most frequently do not go this far, however. During a recent joint operation, Afghan and Soviet fightingmen routed Jelaludin's band in the district of Khakijabar. Weapons of American, British and West German make seized from the bandits were shown to reporters: grenades filled with thousands of tiny toxic pellets and white phosphorous, a mine containing soman....

"Do not distract from the truth with a lie in order to conceal the truth." It appears that the "fighters for the faith" have written off this commandment of the Koran as unnecessary. How, oh how the dushman would like to fill the SOLDIER OF FORTUNE order! Not for nothing did Rabbani, ringleader of a large counterrevolutionary alliance, demand with annoyance in one of the letters captured by Afghan scouts that the bandit underground in Herat lay the facts, the facts and more facts, onto the table.

The name of this former feudal lord and exporter of karakul, and former theology instructor at Kabul University is well known in Afghanistan. Rabbani means plunder and murder. It was "Professor" Rabbani who headed a delegation of high-ranking dushman which visited Washington, Paris and London in June. It was he who was told there: "Your goal is Afghanistan's freedom; this is also our goal!"

...Poisoned tanks of drinking water, thousands of dead children.... Is this really what "freedom" means to the West?

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. Incendiary-and-smoke grenades filled with white phosphorous.
2. Chemical and incendiary ammunition of American and West German make used by the dushman.

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AFGHANISTAN

PROFILE OF HELICOPTER PILOT HERO

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 86 p 3

[Report by Lt Col A. Vasilets, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The Site of the Feat--Afghanistan": "To the Aid of Friends"]

[Text] The day was just beginning, and the airfield concrete still held the nighttime cool.

With enjoyment Captain Vladimir Kucherenko poured water over himself from an irrigation canal, invigorating himself for the day ahead. The crew members were still asleep, exhausted from the unexpected night flight. Kucherenko had been unable to sleep, however. This was strange, and there appeared to be no important reasons for insomnia. But he could not get that Afghan soldier out of his mind: the Captain reproached himself for not asking his name.

...In the dead of night the duty man had touched the sleeping Kucherenko on the shoulder, trying not to awaken the others:

"Comrade Captain, you have a flight...."

It turned out that a vehicle carrying food for Afghan children had been blown up by a mine. The driver was wounded. He had to be taken to a hospital immediately.

The crew was already at the aircraft when Kucherenko arrived at the parking area from headquarters.

"Ready for start-up," Senior Lieutenant S. Korchagin, navigator-pilot, reported. Warrant Officer P. Burlaka, flight technician, had already removed the end caps.

They took off, gained altitude and set a course in the dark for the designated site. The somber silhouettes of mountains slowly advanced toward the helicopter, looking like gigantic monsters against the backdrop of the sky. Had the dushman [bandits] set up an ambush somewhere on a mountain peak and, hearing the noise of the helicopter, were now waiting for the right moment to shell it? No, the bandits could see nothing against the background of the mountains. But they must not become silhouetted against the brighter screen of the sky. They had to drop lower and lower. How difficult it is to do this in pitch darkness, though!

The site where the column waited in a canyon was now somewhere nearby.

"Altitude 50, 45, 30..., " Korchagin reported the readings from the radio altimeter.

"Ground, show your lights," Kucherenko radioed, and two bright spots from flashlights covered by sleeves immediately flashed quite nearby, ahead and below.

"Altitude 20, 15, 10...."

"I see it, Commander!" Burlaka exclaimed. Kucherenko himself could already see the eroded outline of the roadway, however.

A new difficulty arose at that point: the propeller stirred up clouds of dust, and a gray blanket immediately blocked out everything.

"Light!" Kucherenko almost screamed.

"Two pale flashes cut through the dust and darkness, indicating the landing site. At almost the same moment the wheels touched the rocky ground.

...Kucherenko could not go to sleep when he returned, either from the tension or because he had not learned the name of the Afghan soldier. How was he doing? Had they been able to save him? He decided to go to headquarters and phone the hospital where our doctors were to operate on the Afghan comrade. He had not taken three steps, however, when he saw a runner racing toward him:

"Comrade Captain, the commander wants to see you at once!"

Kucherenko stepped up his pace. The commanders of the other crews were already in the office. Lieutenant Colonel S. Savchenko, the squadron commander, waited until everyone had settled down and then began speaking in a low but firm voice:

"We have a difficult assignment. A risky one, I would say. The 'ghosts' have pinned down a group of Afghan soldiers on a peak in the mountains. Their ammunition is running out. Help can only come from us, from the sky. Every minute is important. There is one problem, however. The area is cut off by a high ridge, too high for us to cross. We can only get there through Rotten Canyon."

"Every square meter there holds a machine gun!" someone said in a low voice.

"People say that even the birds don't fly there...."

"That's OK, we'll get through," Savchenko said. "We'll climb as high as we can."

"What about flying right over their heads?" Kucherenko asked, rising from his seat. "In the first place, the element of surprise is on our side. In the second place, only one or two machine guns can fire at the helicopters at the same time, and the top guns will be unable to fire. In the third place, we can make things hot for them too in this case."

All of the crew commanders supported Kucherenko's suggestion. Savchenko summed things up:

"OK, let's try it. I'll lead the group. To the aircraft!"

The enormous bulk of the mountain ridge propped up the sky, with the tallest peaks concealed in the clouds. A single, narrow fissure cut through the mountains as though from the blow of a giant ax. A gloomy gorge, the steep walls of which almost never saw the sun and were therefore always damp and overgrown with lichens. Rotten Canyon was a putrid place: the bandits had settled in there, cutting off the road from one mountain area to another. Dozens of gun emplacements were located on the upper slopes of the canyon and along the bottom.

One after another, the rotary-winged machines dived upon approaching the canyon and burst into the rocky interior. Kucherenko saw the surprised dushmany hastily grab for their weapons, but they immediately fell to the ground without firing a single shot: some felled by the helicopter fire; others, out of fright at the roaring machines which had swept down onto their very heads. Those dushmany who had taken positions high up could simply not see the helicopters far below.

They swept through the gorge without losses. After bursting forth from the canyon, they flew over some mountains and began looking for the subunit surrounded by the bandits.

The group of Afghan soldiers was on a narrow ledge no more than 2 meters wide, at the very top of the mountain. On the other side was a precipice with no visible bottom: it was covered with fog. They circled the mountain two or three times, but it was absolutely impossible to approach the ledge.

"We'll have to hover at the level of the peak. From there they can jump through the open door of the helicopter," Kucherenko suggested.

"The 'ghosts' will shoot them down. They are right nearby," the commander said dubiously.

"The mountains should block us off. Cover me, and I'll try!"

"Come in from the direction of the sun!"

On the ground preparations were made for climbing to the peak. The first few soldiers prepared themselves for the jump, while the others, with support from the helicopter crews, continued to hold off the bandits.

Kucherenko cautiously maneuvered the helicopter so that the propeller blades sliced through the air right over the heads of the soldiers. The helicopter's left wheel was suspended above the ledge; the right, over the abyss.

Burlaka grabbed the first Afghan to jump and drew him into the cabin. A second man jumped, and then a third.

Kucherenko maintained the helicopter's weight balance with difficulty. Rising currents swept up from the abyss, while fiery traces flashed right in front of the cabin on the other side. The helicopter grew heavier and sank each time a soldier jumped. The weight had to be balanced, and the rocking countered. Eyes filled with sweat.

"That's enough!" Kucherenko yelled without turning.

The helicopter slowly cast off from the peak in the direction of the precipice to avoid the dushman fire. Another took its place. The entire group was soon evacuated.

At the airfield the helicopter crews gathered around Lieutenant Colonel Sovchenko. The physical, but most importantly, the nervous, fatigue was such that no one uttered a word. One of them leaned against a helicopter with his back. Another sat down right on the concrete, dropping his head on his knees. After a long silence, Sovchenko said in a low and broken voice:

"You did a fine job. Thank you all. Especially Kucherenko. For his resourcefulness. Now it is time for a rest. We'll do the critique later."

No one stirred. They did not have the strength to move. Sovchenko glanced over his comrades and found the one he was looking for:

"You said that birds don't fly there, but you flew through it yourself!"

"But that had to be done!"

Smiles lighted up the tired faces. The men began moving and talking in a restrained manner. The tension had been relieved somewhat.

Kucherenko's thoughts returned once again to the night flight. He decided to call the hospital and learn the fate of the wounded man. He did not have to phone anywhere, however. A runner spied Kucherenko and exclaimed joyfully:

"Comrade Captain, I was asked to report to you that the operation was a success. The Afghan driver is alive!"

The days went by, and rarely did they pass without flights on missions.

Once, Kucherenko flew out on a joint aerial reconnaissance mission with Captain V. Klochko. When the combat helicopters had destroyed a dushman ambush they had spotted, Kucherenko was about to turn the helicopter around to go back. The flight technician suddenly yelled:

"Look, Comrade Commander!"

A large-caliber machine gun could be seen behind one of the large boulders. There was not a soul around.

Kucherenko made a circle and saw several more gun emplacements with no one near the machine guns. "Why not pick up a machine gun?" the daring idea flashed through his mind. He reported the situation to the command post. Ground replied: "Proceed in accordance with the situation."

"I'm going to land. Cover me!" Kucherenko told the wingman.

They hovered over the machine gun. Burlaka had jumped down, when a dushman suddenly sprang out from behind a boulder, holding a rifle horizontally. Burlaka did not see him. Korchagin got a fix on the bandit, however, and a submachine-gun round immediately resounded. The dushman fell. Burlaka tried to lift the machine gun, but was unable to. Korchagin came to his assistance, and the two of them shoved the machine gun into the cabin.

At the airfield the senior chief listened to Kucherenko's story and then asked:

"You mean there are more machine guns? Can you do the same thing again?"

"I can!" Kucherenko replied confidently.

Kucherenko's crew made another landing, took on board a second machine gun and delivered it to the airfield. The combat helicopters destroyed the remaining gun emplacements and cleared the way for an Afghan column....

I have told about only a few episodes in the life of Captain Vladimir Anatolyevich Kucherenko, pilot and Hero of the Soviet Union. They took only slightly more than 4 hours of flying time. During the entire time he has served in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Kucherenko has accumulated almost 1,000 hours, and each of them has demanded great effort, courage and heroism.

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AFGHANISTAN

PRAVDA REJOINDER ON DRA TROOP PULLOUT, U.S. CLAIMS

LD120628 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0232 GMT 12 Nov 86

["PRAVDA rejoinder"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Nov (TASS)--Under the heading "An Ultra Absurdity," PRAVDA today publishes a rejoinder by Yevgeniy Grigoryev to the fabrications by Martinez, a representative of the U.S. State Department, that Soviet troops have not been leaving Afghanistan, and that the withdrawal of six regiments of Soviet troops from the DRA was somehow a "sham."

The rejoinder says that Martinez, replying to a question put forward by the State Department for "its own press" as to whether the U.S. diplomatic office had any information about the "arrival of new contingents," without batting an eyelid, claimed: "We have seen reports about the arrival of Soviet troops in Afghanistan."

The absurdity of this latest propaganda performance on the stage of the State Department is obvious, PRAVDA writes. But one should not be surprised: If in Washington they tried to misinform the public about Reykjavik, then by those standards there should be nothing to stop them lying about the affairs of Afghanistan.

It is not for nothing that they fear the truth in Washington. But what if the American public, having learned of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, should ask the administration: Isn't it time to stop arming the dushman terrorists and to end the undeclared war by the United States against the DRA; isn't it time to set about settling the regional conflict by deeds and not words? But, the rejoinder says, it is not deeds that they want in Washington. That is why they brought Martinez out onto the stage to extol: "sham withdrawal"; "new arrivals."

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AFGHANISTAN

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA HITS U.S. SUPPORT OF AFGHAN REBELS

PM211643 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Nov 86 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "Terrorists and Their Patrons"]

[Text] It was a car filled with explosives, as it later transpired, that had been specially left in the immediate vicinity of one of Kabul's schools. When classes were over and the students were coming out in a happy crowd, the explosive device was triggered and a powerful explosion rocked the neighborhood....

And who organized this monstrous act? The Afghan BAKHTAR news agency gives an unequivocal reply: Terrorists who had entered the country from abroad. Operating in the guise of "fighters for freedom and belief," it is they who perpetrate bloody crimes such as these on Afghan soil--the victims being, as a rule, the innocent population.

For a long time now Western "defenders of the oppressed Afghan people's rights" have begrudged neither means nor efforts to present these murderers and mercenaries as the "true representatives of free Afghanistan." But the criminal nature of the actions carried out by these "representatives" irrefutably shows that their aim and task is to bring the Afghan people fear and terror and force them to renounce the path of free and independent development they have chosen. The dushmans destroy schools and hospitals, shoot down passenger planes, plant bombs in crowded places, and murder activists or even peasants simply working in the fields, and these "fighters for belief" frequently take reprisals against members of the clergy.

But the West does not merely offer these inveterate terrorists propaganda defense. It does not begrudge them extensive financial aid either. And the fact that this aid is allocated under various "humane" slogans does not make it truly humane. Providing this aid through secret channels is preferable, incidentally. For example, since 1980 the United States alone has spent almost 1.5 billion dollars on this, which has allowed the American press to christen aid to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries "the most major CIA secret operation since the Vietnam war." Nevertheless, in the immediate future this figure is to be increased by a further several hundred million dollars, as is clear from statements by Washington officials. This is because the United States intends to increase its

deliveries of sophisticated weaponry to the bandits--"Stinger" and "Blowpipe" antiaircraft missiles in particular.

This kind of anti-Afghan "consistency" on the part of Washington is completely in line with the current policies of the White House, which, on the one hand, detects "centers of terrorism" where there is no trace of them and, on the other, supports the most inveterate terrorists, calling them "freedom fighters" and setting them against their own people who do not wish to submit to imperialist diktat.

What is more, the rebels are trained how to "best" carry out their bloody trade. To be satisfied of [words indistinct] to acquaint oneself with the special dushman saboteur and terrorist training manual prepared and published by the U.S. CIA. Dozens of these publications were seized by the Afghan Army during an operation to break up one of the counterrevolutionary groups which had crossed into the DRA from Pakistan. The rebels not only had "literature," they also had other "training aids"--handguns with silencers, portable explosive devices, the latest grenades, and chemical substances.

So what is meant by "defending the rights" of the Afghan people--a process which, according to the Western masters' plans, must be carried out on DRA territory by CIA mercenaries? To answer this question it is enough to acquaint oneself with the 95-page "manual" entitled "Lessons in Guerrilla Warfare." The titles of its sections eloquently speak for themselves: "How to Use Light Weapons," "Laying Mines," "Chemicals and Their Practical Application," "Organizing Ambushes," "Destroying Bridges, Highways, and Communications," and so forth. Each chapter is furnished with perfectly intelligible diagrams and drawings. Another "manual" entitled "War Behind Enemy Lines" is compiled according to the same principle.

It is in accordance with these "manuals" that the dushmans trained at Pakistani bases perpetrate their bloody crimes on Afghan soil, receiving considerable sums of money for this from their masters. There are even special rates of pay for their crimes. This is one of them: Kill a soldier in the Afghan Army and you receive 5-7,000 afghanis; kill a party activist or a state employee and you receive 10-15,000; kill an officer and you are paid up to 30,000 afghanis....

"Falling prey to the promises made by hostile propaganda," (M. Kadyr), native of a village in Kabul Province, said, "I joined the ranks of the 'defenders of Islam' and became a member of a dushman group. However, I saw no struggle for the 'freedom of Islam.' Our group engaged solely in robbery and brigandage. Those not in agreement with these actions were shot on the spot by the leaders. To save my own life I was forced to burn down schools and mosques. I also witnessed how the 'defenders of the people' robbed innocent peasants to their last afghani, deprived young women of their honor, and tortured party and state workers who were taken prisoner."

In an attempt to avoid participating in crimes such as these, (Kadyr) fled to Pakistan. He believed he would be able to live honestly there and secure himself against dushman reprisals. However, he was apprehended by the Pakistani authorities and sent to one of the "Afghan refugee" camps--an area behind barbed wire with watchtowers at every corner. (Kadyr) was threatened with reprisals if he did not join the ranks of a group preparing to enter the DRA. He agreed, but as soon as he was in Afghanistan again he gave himself up to the authorities. "Today," (M. Kadyr) concludes, "I well understand what is meant by human rights. I have my own home, a job. Here, in my own land, I found the most important human right--the right to life."

And here is the story of (Gulyam Khasan) from Jozjan Province, which is extremely similar to the ordeal suffered by (M. Kadyr). "During the years I spent far from my own country," he said, "I came to understand well that the freedom discussed so much by the enemies of the Afghan people is actually meaningless to them. What kind of freedom can they talk about when they attach no value to human life?! What kind of human rights can they expatiate on when they finance and supply with weapons rebels causing death and destruction in the land of Afghanistan?! Only when I returned home did I have real rights and freedoms and the opportunity to work peacefully for the good of the fatherland."

There are many confessions like this, because more and more Afghans are breaking with their dishonest past and becoming involved in building a new life. Their confessions debunk the inventions of Western "champions" of the Afghan people's "rights" and tear the mask from those who pose as "freedom fighters." This is even said across the ocean. By THE WASHINGTON POST, for example, which could hardly be suspected of sympathy for democratic Afghanistan. "So what are we doing in Afghanistan?" it asks. And provides the answer itself: "We are secretly supplying weapons to rebels who have not the slightest chance of victory."

This is indeed so!

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AFGHANISTAN

IZVESTIYA HITS FRG AID, SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN REBELS

PM171445 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent Ye. Grishin: "Bonn's Intrigues in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Bonn--West German reactionaries acting on Washington's instructions have set themselves the task of contributing their share to the undeclared war against Afghanistan. To this end, on the initiative of Bundestag Deputy J. Todenhoefer (Christian Democratic Union), anti-DRA "propaganda training courses" have been organized in Bonn and a number of "scientific and charity" organizations have been set up, including the "Bonn committee for Afghan questions," the "society for assistance to Afghan refugees," the "Afghan-German mutual assistance alliance," and the "foundation for the study of Afghanistan."

Facts indicate that within these organizations all kind of "special forces" are being trained which are then sent into the DRA as part of dushman gangs. On their return to the FRG they spread malicious lies and slander about Afghanistan. The "opus" of a certain Carl Freigang which has appeared on the shelves of West German book stores under the title "Doctors in Afghanistan" is a case in point.

The West German doctor, acting along the lines of another doctor (Goebbels), has carried out an, on the whole, simple, operation: He filled 150 pages with descriptions of genuine atrocities perpetrated by bandits on Afghan soil and ascribed them...to Soviet servicemen in the DRA. It is very simple. It happens like this: The dushmans destroy schools, hospitals, mosques... (there is no shortage of this kind of material), and all you have to do is to substitute "Soviet and Afghan soldiers" for "bandit formations" and you are home and dry.

It has been obvious for a long time to any unprejudiced observer that the true source of the Afghan people's sufferings is the undeclared war being waged against the DRA by the dushman gangs trained, armed, and dispatched by the CIA. However, Bonn, too, has not remained on the sidelines either. The FRG occupies second place after the United States among NATO countries in terms of military and financial assistance to the Afghan "Contras." According to press reports, various FRG agencies have already allocated

more than DM350 million for subversive activities against Afghanistan, and in the future they intend to provide a further DM150 million for these purposes. It is with this money that subversive elements and the various "societies" connected with them hire and train "doctors" in the mold of Freigang and other "specials" who are prepared to do any job from espionage missions to spreading slander about the DRA for the right money. The "Voice of Free Afghanistan" subversive radio station established with funds from U.S. and FRG special services and under their leadership operates from the FRG.

Bonn official circles openly maintain contacts with the ringleaders of the Afghan counterrevolution and give them all-around assistance. Thus in March of this year the cutthroats and CIA hirelings Rabbani, Mojaddedi, Gaylani, and Mohajer-zade were invited to attend Bundestag "hearings on the Afghan question." Obviously sensing that some people in the Bundestag were on their side, the dushmans brazenly demanded increased military and financial aid for subversive actions in the DRA.

Ranking FRG politicians--Bundestag Deputies J. Todenhoefer, U. Fischer, and M. Horacek, for instance--illegally crossed the Afghan border, and Bundeswehr Major (E. Kotnyy) took part in a dushman attack on the Jalalabad power grid. On their return to the FRG the aforementioned individuals published malicious anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan fabrications in the press, thus misleading public opinion in European countries. A few days ago Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer, Bundestag deputy for the Free Democratic Party, left for Pakistan to inspect subversive Afghan counterrevolutionary bases there. In Bonn she runs the so-called "Society for Assistance to Afghanistan." The aim of her trip is to hear the dushman ringleaders fabrications about the domestic situation in the DRA and to convey expressions of support on behalf of the FRG government to them.

This kind of action by officials on the Rhine who pay lip service to the wish to settle the situation around Afghanistan in effect only serves the destabilization of the situation and the intensification of the armed intervention against the DRA.

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AFGHANISTAN

KOMSOMOL BODY GUILTY OF INDIFFERENCE TO BLINDED DRA VETERANS

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by A. Kalinin: "A Soldier Returns and Is Warmly Met in his Hometown -- Only Komsomol Workers Avoided His House"]

[Text] The handwriting was unfamiliar, but Vatiliiy himself had written the letter. Sergey knew this by the uneven, closely crowded lines. These stumbling letters hurt him more than a sharp razor, for he realized that his brother couldn't see.

Vatiliiy had gone on that mission without him, the first time this had happened during their service in Afghanistan. Sergey had trouble keeping himself occupied for the entire time the company was in the mountains and when his comrades appeared along the KPP [regimental command post] one day, Sergey ran to them, trying to pick out the familiar figure of his brother in the twilight. But his brother wasn't among them.

"Where is Vatiliiy?" he asked first one, then another. "Where is Vitalka?" Then, growing cold because of his premonition of misfortune, he shouted, "Where is he? Why are you all quiet? Where is he?"

They had run into some mines on their return to camp. They had been walking along a narrow mountain path, already thinking about a quick rest and suddenly... Vatiliiy barely saw the column of dirt that had exploded from under the feet of Petr Shapovalov who was walking ahead of him. Thrown to the ground by the explosion, he immediately jumped up, still not understanding what had happened, and after spitting out the dirt that filled his mouth, he began hoarsely to ask, "What happened to me, lads? Why is everything dark?"

Everything after that was vague. His brother went to the hospital where he found Vitaliiy asking everyone if he would be able to see. Sergey calmed him. He then regained consciousness in Tashkent. And when he regained consciousness again, he was in Odessa. He asked for a pad of paper and a pen, but had strength enough for only a dozen words. He wrote what he thought at the time was of prime importance. "Serezha, don't tell Mama that I have been wounded..."

But his mother had already guessed everything.

Her sons alternately wrote home. A letter from Sergey, then one from Vitaliy. But recently only Sergey had been writing and the mother understood that something was wrong with Vitaliy. And when the oldest son Sasha brought her the letter from Sergey in which he decided to tell his mother the truth, she got ready to travel.

At about the same time Ivan Ivanovich Strelchenko, twice Hero of Socialist Labor and chief of the section where Vitaliy's father worked, procured a pass for him to go to the rest home in Odessa.

Initially the father did not understand. "Why should I rest there?"

Strelchenko admonished him with, "Don't make a fool of yourself, Vladimir Mikhaylovich. There will be a table, a roof over your head and the trip is free. And the money will prove useful, as your son will be getting married."

Fedulov didn't say anything to that. He only took a deep breath.

A few days later he went to tell his wife.

At that same time Sergey received a strange letter. It was from his brother, but was signed as follows: Vitaliy, Sveta. He was at a loss. Who was this Sveta? Was it possible that this girl who Vitaliy had met only about two months before going into the army had found Vitalka?

Sveta had suddenly stopped getting letters from Vitaliy. She couldn't figure out why. About that same time she left Donetsk and went to school near Odessa to train to become a waitress on cruise ships. Everything was falling into place: the training, Komsomol work, letters from Vitaliy. And then the letters stopped. What had upset him? Had he lost her address? She was lost in conjecture until she got a letter from a friend who lived near the Fedylovs. The letter explained everything and Sveta rushed to Odessa.

There was a rumor that some girl was trying to get in to see Fedulov and was headed toward their room. Who is it? Is it possible ...? His heart began to thump desperately.

"What kind of dress is she wearing," he asked the lads who could see. "A red one," they answered.

"And a knitted cap?" "Yes," they said.

His heart fell and turned cold. She was here! If only they would not let her in. If only they would say that he wasn't there. If only there were somewhere to hide until. But the door opened. He stood up, whiter than his bandages.

Sveta made a suggestion, despite all the unwritten laws. This occurred on Vitaliy's birthday. They had talked until morning and as she was preparing to leave, Sveta simply said, "Let's register to get married..."

And seeing that he wanted to object, she covered his shrapnel-wounded lips with her palm. "I am ready for anything, Talechka. I can handle it, for I am strong."

They returned home together. Donetsk met them with sunshine and flowering gardens, for spring was in full bloom. They didn't drag the wedding out. Mendelssohn's march had stopped, the young people had entered their parents' home and were sitting at a table that had been decorated for the holiday when the door opened and, a miracle, who should enter but Sergey. He headed right to the wedding table, kissed his parents and his brothers and bowed low to Svetlana. He looked at this girl with the eyes of the lads who were still in Afghanistan.

The work-week began.

What irritated Vitaliy the most was the inactivity. He was a leader by nature and not a single Komsomol activity in school could take place without him. He was always in the center of any event in the army and even in the hospital. And at home he began to languish. His mother and father went to work. Sveta went off to her studies (she would soon be entering a pedagogical school) and Vitaliy was left home alone in the three-room apartment. He tried to mop the floors and make supper, but the results were poor. Once he took his father's old accordion and passed his hands over the keyboard. Once, then again. He liked what he got. He was soon playing the balalaika and the guitar as well. But this was not enough. He wanted work. He waited for anyone who would come to him, engage in a heart-to-heart talk and suggest, "Vitaliy, you are not trying; here, try this." He wanted to be needed.

The Society for the Blind was able to help to some degree. A vehicle brought him work once every few days. This would not have been anything special for you and I and you could say that it was tedious, but Vitaliy avidly took to the work and would not get up from the table for hours. Then fall arrived and the rains came. The road became impassible and the vehicle stopped coming. Vitaliy again languished.

His father suggested, "Maybe we could go to the mine and ask them to bring up some vehicles with sand to repair the road."

Vitaliy immediately sulked and in a toneless voice said, "You don't have to, father, don't humiliate yourself. If they can't see the need themselves, it won't help."

When Vitaliy Fedulov had come back from the hospital and had gone to the Petrovskiy Komsomol raykom to register, they had sent him back to the committee at the Trudovskaya Mine. They explained that the Komsomol committee there had the same rights as the raykom and would do everything that had to be done. Vitaliy didn't know what this entailed. And it later turned out that the secretary of the mine Komsomol Committee, Oleg Kiyashko, also didn't know.

The fact was that Vitaliy had lost his Komsomol card. It had disappeared before he regained consciousness in the hospital. The unit had sent only his registration card with an information card that said his Komsomol card had become unfit as a result of his being wounded. That wasn't enough for Oleg and from time to time he would go to Fedulov to ask what he, the Komsomol secretary, could do. On one of his visits Vitaliy showed him the information card. Kiyashko sighed sympathetically and left. A few days, weeks and months passed. The mine's Komsomol organization lived its life and Vitaliy lived his.

One day Vitaliy thought about making a small bench along his house. This way he could sit in the sun and talk with neighbors. He went to the mine. "Brothers, help me with a pair of bars and small planks." "What are you talking about," they said, "we won't build you a bench or an entire pavilion. You don't want to go out in the street." He returned home and began to wait. Again days and weeks passed. He never returned to the mine and he didn't tell his father.

I met with Oleg Kiyashko sometime later in the Komsomol raykom.

"I know the Fedulov brothers very well. I have been to Vitaliy's several times."

"What store is he registered with?"

Oleg began to laugh.

"With the hospital? A drug store?"

The Komsomol secretary fell silent. I was also silent because I knew what those chief's visits had entailed. They had been working on new Komsomol documents for a year and a half and had finally issued the Komsomol card. But they soon asked that he return the card. Vitaliy had not been invited to a single Komsomol meeting this entire time. They had not even sent him a holiday greeting. And all that time, while Oleg unraveled the non-existent registration problems, Vitaliy was marking time in the doctor's office and was being driven by his wife from the store to the ors [department of workers' supply] and back.

Meanwhile Petr Shapovalov, the same Shapovalov with whom Vitaliy had detonated the Dushman mine, frequently dropped in to see Fedulov. He had obtained quarters in a new building, got a vehicle and had enrolled in the institute. He had only one problem. There was no place to keep the car. People in the raykom found out about this. They helped him with materials, organized a number of subbotniks [free labor on week-ends or overtime] and the problem was solved. He had a garage. Petr was always in the thick of events and was involved in all Komsomol activities. Vitaliy envied his comrade and was puzzled. All of these good things had not happened at the other end of the world; they had happened in neighboring Kirovskiy Rayon.

The three of us, Krapivnitskiy, Kiyashko and myself, went to Fedulov. Vitaliy was not there -- he was undergoing examinations. Svetlana opened the door.

Raykom first secretary A. Krapivnitskiy recognized her and said, "Well, here's our former activist."

The fact that she was an activist was true. She had worked as Senior Pioneer Leader in her school. And Vitaliy had been a production Young Pioneer Leader. The fact that they were no longer activists was not their fault.

Krapivnitskiy said, "Well then, this summer you register him at the mine Pioneer camp: he will rest there and at the same time conduct military-patriotic work. We will find him employment here. We can move you in when you get quarters."

After writing his telephone number on a piece of paper, he handed it to Svetlana and said, "If you need something, call."

Months passed. Vitaliy and Svetlana had a son whom they named Volodiya in honor of his grandfather. Their troubles increased, but these were happy troubles. When his brothers Sergey and Aleksandr had a free hour or so, they hurried to Vitaliy to talk and help where needed. Vitaliy's co-workers congratulated the new parents on their first-born. The new district doctor calls regularly. Now only Komsomol workers avoid their home.

There somewhere in Svetlana's notebook is the page with Aleksey Krapivnitskiy's telephone number at work, but she has not called that number.

EDITOR'S NOTE -- There was a meeting of the Donetsk Komsomol obkom Buro while this material was being readied for print. The buro looked into the question of how the Petrovskiy Rayon Komsomol in Donetsk worked with soldiers who had returned from their international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. First secretary of the Petrovskiy raykom Aleksey Krapivnitskiy was removed from his position for formalism, procrastination and his callous attitude toward the fate of military internationalists and toward invalid first-order Vitaliy Fedulov. Former secretary of the Trudovskaya Mine Komsomol Committee Oleg Kiyashko was expelled from the Komsomol. A council of military internationalists has been established in the rayon and Vitaliy Fedulov was elected as its chairman. The Fedulovs were assigned a three-room apartment and Vitaliy's parents were given quarters in the same building. He is now resting in a holiday hotel on the shores of the Azovskoye More.

It would appear that this story has reached its logical conclusion. But nonetheless, we decided to print it. We did this because there are still Komsomol organizations that are not giving military internationalists the necessary attention. And this is their direct responsibility.

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AFGHANISTAN

BIOGRAPHIES OF HEROES OF SOVIET UNION

Major Kuchkin, Political Worker

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 18, 1986 p 24

[Article under the rubric "For Emulation--the Feat": "Soviet Character"]

[Text] Major Gennadiy Pavlovich Kuchkin was born into a worker's family in 1954 in the city of Kinel, Kuybyshev Oblast. After graduating from secondary school, he entered the Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School, which he completed in 1975. He served as a tank platoon commander, as secretary of a regimental Komsomol committee, deputy commander for political affairs of a tank battalion and then a motorized rifle battalion. He served as a member of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. He entered the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin in 1983, from which he has now graduated.

G.P. Kuchkin was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and heroism demonstrated in the performance of his international duty.

The road now looped among mighty mountains of rock, now suddenly climbed steeply upward, and from the crest would open up a vast panorama of peaks, mottled canyons, mounds of rubble and jutting ledges of weathered, reddish-yellow rock. Captain Kuchkin scrutinized those rocky labyrinths until his eyes ached, looking for the glint of the sun off the lens of a sight or the metal of a weapon somewhere. Or some other sign of a dushman [bandit] ambush.

How many such roads with their sharp bends lay behind, on which every turn could mean a turn of fate for one or even a turn in one's life! More than once, after all, a round of machine-gun fire had sliced out from the rocky lairs like the blade of a sword, or mines had come flying out, destroying the millennia-old still of the mountain barrens.

Kuchkin had thoroughly studied the ways of the enemy and learned how to counter them with restraint and calm, with extreme vigilance and a preparedness to issue

a devastating rebuff to the bandits at any moment. A political worker by position and calling, he understood and felt acutely, in his heart, the importance of the job being performed by the fightingmen. They were not only delivering food and clothing to the workers of distant villages but also helping the seed of a new life to take root in the nation.

It had become the political worker's rule to bring up the end of the column. It was always most dangerous there. On the mountain cliffs, where it was sometimes impossible even to deploy, the bandits would try to cut off and destroy the rear vehicles.

Once, at a mountain crossroad, the armored personnel carrier in which the officer was riding encountered a subunit of the Afghan army. Kuchkin immediately noticed alarm in their eyes and uncertainty in their actions. It was learned that the soldiers were supposed to cut off the route of the dushmany, but the road had been mined and the sappers would not be arriving soon. There was no way around the site.

A look of amazement suddenly froze in the eyes of the young, inexperienced soldiers in the Afghan subunit. The Soviet armored personnel carrier went around their column and advanced along the road. Over that very area before which they had stopped, undecided. But there were mines there!

Yes, there were mines. There was also something else, however: Soviet character, the duty of the fightingman--patriot and internationalist. One hundred meters, 150, 200.... Everyone was literally frozen to the spot by the tension. An explosion suddenly resounded. When the smoke and dust settled, they could see a torn-away wheel spinning at the edge of the road, but the Soviet officer's vehicle lurched stubbornly ahead.

An abrupt order rang out over the stationary column. The Afghan subunit rushed forward and passed the damaged Soviet vehicle.

So many roads like this! And each one a test for the soldiers in the battalion and for Major Kuchkin, political worker. They were Soviet people, and they passed those tests with honor.

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Biographical Portraits of Soldiers

Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 11, Jun 86 pp 40-41

[Text] We Are Internationalists

Viktor Dmitriyevich Kapshuk was born in 1965 in the village of Karapyshi, Kiev Oblast.

He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR in October 1983. He served as a member of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

On December 1985 he enrolled as a cadet at the Higher Border Political Order of the October Revolution Red Banner School of the USSR KGB imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov.

Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev was born in 1954 in the village of Volodarskoye in Volodarskiy Rayon, Kokchetav Oblast. He completed the Ordzhonikidze Double Order of the Red Banner Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Yeremenko. He served as a member of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. He completed the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze in 1985. He is presently again serving on the soil of friendly Afghanistan.

Nabi Makhmadzhanovich Akramov was born in 1957 in the city of Ura-Tyube in the Tajik SSR. He studied at the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev. He served in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and then in the Kiev Military District. He has been a student at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze since 1983.

Aleksandr Vladimirovich Koryavin was born in 1965 in the village of Leshkovo in Zagorskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.

He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR in the fall of 1983. He served in the Airborne Troops.

He was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union in 1985 for courage and valor demonstrated in the performance of his international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

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Soldiers' Biographies

Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 16, Aug 86 pp 24-25

[Text] Heroes of the Soviet Union, Fightingmen and Internationalists

Igor Vladimirovich Zaporozhan was born in 1959 in the settlement of Yelan in Novokuznetskiy Rayon, Kemerovo Oblast. He completed the Ussuriysk Suvarov School and the Far East Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni K.K. Rokossovskiy. In 1982 he was assigned to the limited contingent of Soviet forces to provide international assistance to the friendly people of Afghanistan.

He is now serving in the Red Banner Central Asian Military District.

Vyacheslav Karibulovich Gaynutdinov was born in 1947 in the city of Dalnerechensk in Maritime Kray. After completing the Syzran Higher Military Air School for Pilots imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR, he served in the Northern Group of Forces and the Red Banner Central Asian and Turkestan military districts. In December of 1979 he was sent to provide international assistance to Afghanistan.

He died a hero's death on 17 August 1980, fulfilling his military and international duty to the end.

Valeriy Nikolayevich Ochirov was born in 1951 in the settlement of Sulfat in Aralskiy Rayon, Kzyl-Orda Oblast. He completed the Syzran Higher Military Air School for Pilots imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR. He served in the Order of Lenin Moscow and Red Banner Baltic military districts and then in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He graduated by correspondence from the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin in 1985.

Vasiliy Vasilyevich Pimenov was born in 1954 in Vitebsk. He completed the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School imeni Lenin Komsomol.

From 1982 to 1984 he served in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He has been a student at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze since 1984.

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AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

END TO GUERRILLA CAMPS URGED--Kabul, 8 Nov--Jirgas (assemblies) of representatives of Pushtun tribes have been taking place in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. BAKHTAR reports that the Afridi tribe has held jirgas in the Khyber area attended by nearly 10,000 people. They spoke out against interference by the Islamabad military regime in democratic Afghanistan's internal affairs and demanded the elimination of the Afghan dushmans' military bases in the province. The counterrevolutionary gangs, the resolutions adopted at the jirgas stress, plunder, pillage, and terrorize the local populace. The tribal representatives stated their resolve to continue the armed struggle to expel the Afghan counterrevolutionary rabble from the territory inhabited by Pushtuns. [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 1] /9604

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